The battle for digital sovereignty
The debate on Germany's and the EU's “digital sovereignty” among foreign policy experts remains controversial. Some believe it is no longer possible, while others argue that German military technology startups continue forging ahead.
BERLIN (own report) – The German foreign policy establishment is pursuing the debate on Germany’s and the EU’s “digital sovereignty,” as the basis for genuine independence from the United States. According to a recent special issue of the journal “Internationale Politik,” published by the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), “at present, the structural power in digital technology clearly lies outside Europe,” namely in the USA and China. “US internet companies are so powerful” that “European companies and administrations“ would probably “have to shut down” should the US government “decide to impose an embargo,” according to another article. There, however, is a consensus in the debate that the efforts made so far by the German government and the EU Commission to escape technological dependence, particularly on the United States, have failed. Whereas one author concludes that Berlin and Brussels have now “resigned themselves to a post-sovereign position,” others believe that the battle for tech-sovereignty is still being waged, for example, by young military technology startups in Germany.
Technology as a Battlefield
According to a recent special issue of the journal “Internationale Politik,” technology has become a key battlefield of the new geo-economic order.”[1] According to Katja Muñoz, an expert at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) and Kai Zenner, an assistant to Axel Voss, CDU MEP, “the structural power is clearly situated lies outside of Eui8rope.” “Chinese providers, such as Huawei and ZTE” dominate “5G,” while “the cloud sector is almost entirely controlled by US hyperscalers.” In the sector of semiconductors, on the other hand, Europe is almost completely dependent on “Asian producers, particularly from Taiwan or South Korea.” The situation is even more critical “in the domain of data sovereignty,” Muñoz and Zenner continue. China is in a position to control “access to its own digital space by means of the Great Firewalls” and to obtain new “influence on data streams of Western users” by “using platforms such as TikTok.” On the other hand, the USA dominates “the global data traffic via their digital platforms” and, with the help of CLOUD Act, can gain access to , with the help of CLOUD Act, “data from US tech-companies” – even “if they operate outside the USA.” Europe does not have much to counter this.
Extended US Workbench
Hans-Jürgen Jakobs, senior editor at the Handelsblatt and former business editor at the Süddeutsche Zeitung and Der Spiegel, shares a similar view of sees the situation similarly. Jakobs warns that “the power of the US internet firms in terms of data and artificial intelligence is currently so great” that “European companies and authorities administrations would be forced to shut down if, in the course of a conflict, the US government would decide an embargo.”[2] In relationship view ofto Europe’s dependency on US military equipment, some even worry fear that, in the event of conflict, the US could “render the weapons systems it sells to the EU unusable in the event case of non-compliance.” If Europe’s dependence on foreign technology persists, “sooner or later, the continent will become either the extended workbench of China or of the United States” repeats remarks Jakobs, quoting René Obermann, former CEO of Telekom and the current Chair of the Board of Directors at Airbus. In the meantime, it is becoming “a conditio sine qua non for Europe to become more independent,” according to says the experienced business journalist. Europe, which is at risk of being “pulverized between the two blocks,” must “become a third block alongside the USA and China.” To be able to function “as self-sufficiently as possible with its own strong economic structures,” it needs “an agenda for a relaunch.”
US Market “Vital for Germany”
Various positions are being advocated in the debate on how to achieve a “relaunch.” Muñoz and Zenner advocate “an overriding grand strategy for the digital age.”[3] The EU Commission's most recent international digital strategy strongly resembles the European Gaia-X project for networking digital structures,[4] which was “politically celebrated” but remained “economically irrelevant.” Those who want to “be sovereign participants in the debate” must “develop their own capacities” – for example, “in the cloud sector, in semiconductors, in AI models.” “Those who do not have them” remain “reliant on others,” i.e., dependent. Philipp Staab, professor at Humboldt University in Berlin, disagrees, arguing that the EU Commission's policy to date – such as its refusal to “take aggressive political decisions against the interests of non-European digital companies” – is entirely legitimate. “For Germany in particular,” the US export market has been “too important” to risk confrontation; “for the German automotive industry,” in particular, privileged access to the US market is “vital.” Staab concludes coolly: “Festive speeches about European or German digital sovereignty have long since sounded hollow.”[5]
“Scope of Action in Dependency”
in the current special issue of the journal Internationale Politik, Staab also argues that “digital sovereignty in the sense of significant autonomy for the state or even the economy” is “no longer the goal being pursued” in Europe. “Rather,” a “de-risking approach” is being pursued, whereby “dependencies on non-European providers are being reduced and spread more widely,” but not eliminated.[6] Germany and the EU have since “resigned themselves to a post-sovereign position” in which “the ability of one side to act is the vulnerability of the other, in this case, the Europeans.” However, this is “not only undermining concepts such as digital sovereignty,” but also “the prospect of Europe’s strategic autonomy,” which is “independent” of high-tech powers such as China and the USA. “Instead of sovereignty and strategic capability, the focus is shifting to questions of tactical navigation in an increasingly narrow political space,” writes Staab: “In the intermediate term, it is no longer a question of becoming independent,” but rather of “maintaining as much freedom of action as possible within a context of dependency, while at the same time strengthening one's own resources for action and resilience.”
“Beyond the Public Eye”
A significantly less pessimistic Jacobs also warns that “if Europe does not respond and act now, it will become irrelevant.”[7] However, he adds that “submission” to another power – such as the USA – is “not an option” in Europe. Progress must finally be made, for example in creating the Capital Markets Union, which is necessary to “attract money to Europe for important future investments.” With regard to AI, however, “the race is more open than the hyped up ongoing coverage of ChatGPT from Silicon Valley would suggest.” Jakobs points to the Paris-based AI company Mistral and German armament startups such as Helsing and Arx Robotics, which are striving to avoid using non-European components in their manufacturing (german-foreign-policy.com reported [8]). “Such innovative forms of defense” are “proof of European sovereignty in action,” Jakobs argues, adding that Trump's aggressions, not least against European interests, have long since provoked resistance. The battle for “European sovereignty” is by no means lost, even if it is not currently the focus of public attention: “A lot is happening beyond the public eye.”
[1] Katja Muñoz, Kai Zenner: Europas digitale Zeitenwende. In: Internationale Politik Special Nr. 4/2025. S. 53-57.
[2] Hans-Jürgen Jakobs: Europa, die schöne Unvollendete. In: Internationale Politik Special Nr. 6/2025. S. 6-11.
[3] Katja Muñoz, Kai Zenner: Europas digitale Zeitenwende. In: Internationale Politik Special Nr. 4/2025. S. 53-57.
[4] See also Die europäische Cloud and Risse in Europas „digitaler Souveränität“.
[5], [6] Philipp Staab: Technologischer Imperialismus. In: Internationale Politik Special Nr. 4/2025. S. 28-33.
[7] Hans-Jürgen Jakobs: Europa, die schöne Unvollendete. In: Internationale Politik Special Nr. 6/2025. S. 6-11.
[8] See also „Resilience Factories“ and Die Drohnenkrise“ (II).
