From Kosovo to Lithuania
Bundestag has again extended the Bundeswehr mission in Kosovo. Bombing Yugoslavia in 1999 was a milestone in the remilitarisation of German power politics – now focused on Eastern Europe.
BERLIN/PRISTINA (own report) – Germany will continue its military presence in Kosovo for another year. This was decided by the Bundestag yesterday, Thursday. The Bundeswehr has now been stationed in Kosovo for 26 years. Its declared aim is to stabilise the region. Recent years have, however, seen the situation on the ground repeatedly escalate into violent clashes. Kosovo’s breakaway from Serbia was forced through by a NATO bombing campaign, with active German participation. Since the NATO’s 1999 war on Yugoslavia and the subsequent session, Kosovo is still only recognised by less than half of the UN member states. Germany not only remains an occupying power in Kosovo but has progressively expanded its military influence around Eastern Europe as part of a geostrategic power struggle against Russia. Germany’s participation in the 1999 attack on Yugoslavia without a UN mandate was a decisive step on Berlin’s road to putting German forces back into Eastern Europe and remilitarising German power politics. Berlin is now establishing its first permanent military base abroad – in Lithuania, an area where Germany once waged its war of annihilation against the Soviet Union.
Armed mission for 26 years
A motion to yet again extend the mission mandate for German troop deployment in Kosovo has been passed in Bundestag. The legislative approved the aim to “militarily secure the peace settlement” following Kosovo’s violent secession from Serbia in 1999 and the region’s officially declaration of independence in 2008.[1] Measured against this objective, the success of the mission, which has seen more than 95,000 German soldiers stationed in Kosovo since its inception, has been rather limited. As for the diplomatic aspect, still less than half of all UN member states recognise Kosovo as a separate state in the wake of NATO’s enforced secession of the Serbian province. Indeed, recognition has now been declining.[2] The ‘normalisation agreement’ between Serbia and Kosovo, which was pushed through by Berlin, is in danger of becoming meaningless due to a lack of implementation in practice. The security situation remains poor. Since 2022, there have been repeated violent clashes, including deadly attacks on the Kosovar police.[3] The German government admits that “short-term deteriorations and escalations in the security situation without significant warning” are possible at any time.[4]
German interests
The government’s Bundestag motion adds that, beyond its regional objectives in Kosovo, Berlin is demonstrating with German boots on the ground a “presence in the key geostrategic region of the Western Balkans”.[5] Speakers in the Bundestag from both parties in the ruling coalition (CDU and SPD) agreed that the Bundeswehr’s mission in Kosovo is of geostrategic importance in the context of the struggle for influence in Eastern and Southeastern Europe between the major powers. The German military presence in Kosovo is “not just a contribution of solidarity to the region” as part of KFOR, but also serves “our own interests”, as Marja-Liisa Völlers (SPD), a member of the Bundestag Defence Committee, put it. The aim is to “protect the region from the growing influence of authoritarian actors”, which presumably refers not only to Russia but also China.[6] The point here is that Berlin is clearly unable to secure its influence in Southeast Europe through economic and political means alone. So yesterday, Thursday, the Bundestag voted to extend the Bundeswehr mandate for another year.
1999: breaking the taboo
With armed participation in the Yugoslav War in 1999 and the resulting violent secession of Kosovo from Serbia, Germany broke a foreign policy taboo of historic relevance. In 1945, a defeated Germany had lost not only its army but also its influence in the eastern and southeastern region of Europe, which had once been its fairly exclusive sphere of influence. Fifty-four years lay between the demilitarisation of Germany after the Second World War and the Bundeswehr’s first participation in a war of aggression. That decision to join in the bombing of Yugoslavia represents, in many respects, a break with the post-war order. Domestically, German participation in the war was a decisive blow to those political forces that, after two world wars, called for a political culture of military restraint. In terms of foreign policy, Berlin openly violated international law with this military aggression, pursued by the United States and supported by a German foreign minister from the Green Party. By dismantling Yugoslavia the NATO campaign weakened a regional rival and changed borders in Europe by force of arms. In historical terms, it can also be said that Germany returned militarily to the southeast of the continent as an occupying power.
New ‘self-confidence’
After the attack on Yugoslavia in 1999 Berlin agreed to engagements in subsequent wars, such as Afghanistan and Mali. Germany’s departure from its historically grounded stance of military restraint has gained momentum. We have seen a remilitarisation of German power politics. At the 2014 Munich Security Conference, leading German politicians were now unanimously demanding a new “self-confidence” in the Federal Republic’s foreign and military policy. There was talk of a ‘Munich Consensus’. The then-Federal President Joachim Gauck declared that critics were using “Germany’s guilt for its past as a shield for laziness”. Those voices of caution, which Gauck still felt compelled to counter in 2014, have now largely fallen silent. Defence Minister Boris Pistorius openly calls for the German population to get “fit for war”. And Chancellor Friedrich Merz has declared to the world that Germany wants to become the strongest conventional military power in Europe. The capacity to wage war against a major power has, since 2018, again become the German army’s overriding goal.
Returning to Eastern Europe
Since 2023, Germany has also claimed the role of the “cornerstone” of NATO’s and the EU’s conventional warfare in Europe.[7] As early as 2014 the then-Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen had begun – initially with more cautious language – to rearm and upgrade the Bundeswehr for a war against Russia. Since then, it has become explicit. The Bundeswehr has been rehearsing deployments for fighting Russia in Eastern Europe with increasingly large-scale manoeuvres.[8] It is involved in establishing NATO units for a possible war on the eastern flank and participates in airspace surveillance in the Baltic states. Since 2017, German soldiers have also been stationed in Lithuania, where they are now establishing the first permanent German military base on foreign territory. Lithuania is an area where Germany once waged its brutal war of annihilation against the Soviet Union.[9] In Romania, Germany has for years stationed fighter jets and been participating in armed flights over the Black Sea. The Bundeswehr’s armed intervention in theYugoslav War in 1999 was the first step on the road to Germany’s military return to Eastern Europe. It is now raising the stakes with an armed presence along Russia’s western flank from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea.
[1] Antrag der Bundesregierung: Fortsetzung der Beteiligung bewaffneter deutscher Streitkräfte an der internationalen Sicherheitspräsenz in Kosovo (KFOR). Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 21/230. Berlin, 21.05.2025.
[2] See also: More NATO for Kosovo.
[3] See also: Unrest in Kosovo, Unruhen im Kosovo (II), Unruhen im Kosovo (III) and Unrest in Kosovo (IV).
[4], [5] Motion submitted by the Fedeal Government: Fortsetzung der Beteiligung bewaffneter deutscher Streitkräfte an der internationalen Sicherheitspräsenz in Kosovo (KFOR). Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache 21/230. Berlin, 21.05.2025.
[6] Speech by Marja-Liisa Völlers im Deutschen Bundestag. Berlin, 26.06.2025.
[7] Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien 2023. Bonn, November 2023. See also: “Warfighting Capability” as Guiding Principle for Action.
[8] See also: Unrest in Kosovo and Am Rande des Krieges.
[9] See also: A New Era.
