The Race for Syria (III)

‘A deep state’

In Syria, the leaders of the long-standing jihadist militia Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) have so far managed to consolidate their power. HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa appointed himself interim president on 29 January. And he has been authorised to set up a new legislative council that is to serve until a new constitution comes into force.[1] Al-Sharaa had already stated that the drafting of the new constitution would take around three years. Elections could, he says, possibly be held in four years’ time. In other words, democratic life is likely to be suspended for the next few years. Moreover, it is not at all clear whether this transitional government will succeed in keeping Syria’s diverse communities together. Critics have accused the new rulers of “building informal power structures and a deep state”.[2] It is significant that the transitional government is largely drawn from HTS-dominated circles that ruled the Idlib Governorate from 2017 to 2024 with an iron fist and marginalised non-Sunni sections of the population.[3] For instance, the man appointed prime minister, Muhammad al-Bashir, had already served as prime minister of Idlib, while the new foreign minister, Asaad al-Shaibani, used to be responsible for foreign relations for the Idlib jihadists. The total power-grab by the dominant clique from Idlib is already causing resentment around Syria.

Rising tensions

In addition, tensions are rising between the different groups that make up Syrian society. In January, clashes occurred between elements of the Sunni majority and the Alawite minority. On 31 January, according to the UK-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), Sunni gunmen carried out a massacre of Alawite members of a community in Hama Governorate. Ten Alawites were murdered.[4] Fears that sectarian violence could escalate are growing. There are also serious differences between the transitional regime under Al Sharaa and the Kurdish population in the north of the country, which fears further attacks by Turkish forces and pro-Turkish militias. The main Kurdish organisations, especially the PYD (Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat, Democratic Union Party) and its affiliated armed wing, the YPG (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel, i.e. People's Defence Units), demand autonomy for the Kurdish population of northern Syria. Al-Sharaa rejects any such autonomy and insists on fully integrating the YPG into the newly established Syrian armed forces. Not trusting the Turkey-backed forces behind the power seizure in Damascus, the YPG sees its protective role for the Kurdish minority as essential.[5]

Saudi Money, Turkish Weapons

Aside from making its first decisions on domestic policy, the transitional government is now shaping Syria’s new foreign policy. Last Sunday, Al Sharaa went on his first ever official visit to foreign powers, flying to Saudi Arabia for talks. His second visit, on Tuesday, took him to Turkey. And in Damascus, on 30 January, he received the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al Thani. Turkey and Qatar have long-established channels of influence, having supported HTS in Idlib since 2017 – financially, logistically and militarily. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, officially ceased its support for the Syrian opposition in 2017 and even resumed relations with the then Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in 2023/24. But Riyadh is now seeking a close relationship with Syria’s transitional regime. Gaining a strong position in Syria is important for its wider regional power struggle with Iran. Damascus is hoping above all for financial support from Riyadh for reconstruction, but also for diplomatic support in its efforts to shake off the US and the EU-imposed sanctions. As for Turkey, the new Syrian regime wants its support for training and rearming a new army. In fact, Ankara and Damascus are already working on a roadmap to build up the Syrian armed forces along with a bilateral military agreement.[6]

With Ankara and Riyadh

Government advisors in Germany and EU foreign policy experts are urging Berlin and Brussels to seek close cooperation with Ankara, Riyadh and Doha as a path to future influence in Damascus. As Germany’s Development Minister Svenja Schulze reported in December, Berlin had secured good relations with the rulers in Idlib over the years by providing funds for aid projects in the governorate (german-foreign-policy.com reported [7]). However, even though the transitional government in Damascus is largely recruited from those jihadi circles in Idlib, the links with Berlin are apparently not enough to secure the desired influence going forward. The Berlin-based think-tank SWP (Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik; the German Institute for International and Security Affairs) is advising that the EU cooperate with Turkey on “the reorganisation and reconstruction of Syria”. “A first field of cooperation”, it suggests, could be “joint humanitarian aid and reconstruction projects for the reintegration of returnees.”[8] Another think-tank, the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), notes that the EU will not be the most important player in Syria in the near future, but thinks it might adopt a common position with the Arab Gulf States in order to shape Syria’s future.[9]

Against Russia

In recent days, Berlin and Brussels have intensified their activities designed to influence developments in Syria. German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier visited Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Turkey this week to discuss with each government the Syrian situation and the political outlook.[10] Chancellor Olaf Scholz also addressed all of this in a telephone call with the Emir of Qatar on Tuesday.[11] On Monday, the EU foreign ministers agreed to suspend some of the sanctions on Syria for an initial period of one year, not least with regard to the transport and finance sectors as well as energy infrastructure. Removing this stranglehold on the country is considered essential if reconstruction can proceed in a reasonably orderly manner. However, the EU leaders will also be establishing a mechanism for immediately reinstating their sanctions.[12] The EU also wants leverage for its efforts to push the Syrian transitional government into forcing Russia to disband its naval base at Tartus and its airbase at Hmeimim. Damascus has so far rejected that course of action. On Wednesday, French President Emmanuel Macron spoke with Al Sharaa on the phone and invited him to Paris in the coming weeks, although the date is still unspecified.[13] In pursuit of French influence in Syria, Paris is gaining an advantage over Berlin.

More on this topic: Wettlauf um Syrien and The race for Syria (II).

[1] Syria’s Ahmed al-Sharaa named president for transitional period. aljazeera.com 29.01.2025.

[2] Christoph Ehrhardt: Ahmed al-Scharaa festigt seine Herrschaft in Syrien. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 31.01.2025.

[3] See also: Upheavals in Syria (II).

[4] Tony Gamal-Gabriel: Syria’s Alawites mourn their dead after revenge attacks. al-monitor.com 05.02.2025.

[5] Ghazal Golshiri: En Syrie, les défis du général kurde Mazloum Abdi : « Nous ne demandons pas la sécession, mais une autonomie renforcée » du Rojava. lemonde.fr 15.01.2025.

[6] Ezgi Akin: Turkey, Syria draft road map to strengthen Syrian military: What we know. al-monitor.com 06.02.2025.

[7] See: Wettlauf um Syrien.

[8] Yaşar Aydın: Syrien: Welche Rolle spielen die Türkei und Deutschland? swp-berlin.org 06.02.2025.

[9] Emily Tasinato: All change: How Europeans and Gulf Arab states can promote Syria’s political transition. ecfr.eu 03.02.2025.

[10] Steinmeier im Nahen Osten. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 05.02.2025.

[11] Bundeskanzler Scholz telefoniert mit dem Emir von Katar, Scheich Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa al Thani. bundesregierung.de 04.02.2025.

[12] EU will Sanktionen gegen Syrien vorläufig aussetzen. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 28.01.2025.

[13] Adam Lucente: Macron invites Syria’s Sharaa to France for first EU visit: What to know. al-monitor.com 05.02.2025.