Upheavals in Syria (I)
Sanctions imposed by Germany and the EU have contributed to the fall of Bashar al Assad. Jihadist militia Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) can thank Europe for its breakthrough to power in Damascus.
DAMASCUS/BERLIN (own report) - With their sanctions against Syria, Germany and the EU have contributed to the fall of Syrian President Bashar al Assad and the triumph of the jihadist militia Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS). The fact that the HTS offensive could lead to the capture of Damascus in just eleven days had several causes. There was widespread corruption in the Syrian armed forces, and they were in part infiltrated by opposition activists. The internal corrosion meant that the army melted away when the HTS launched its military campaign. State corruption and general discontent among the population were, however, fuelled by Western sanctions, with really drastic consequences. Syrians faced a massive increase in poverty and hunger. As early as 2019, the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) warned that the sanctions ultimately amounted to a “scorched earth policy that indiscriminately and arbitrarily punishes ordinary Syrians”. A beneficiary of the widespread discontent has been the HTS. The Islamist militant group, which was able to establish a repressive regime in the Idlib governorate based on a harsh interpretation of Sharia law, is now taking power in Damascus.
On the road to normalisation
The fall of Syrian President Bashar al Assad blindsided many observers, experts and politicians. After all, Damascus had managed to overcome its isolation in recent years and was gradually normalising its foreign relations. A good example was its closer relationship with the countries of the Arab world. At the end of 2018, the United Arab Emirates was the first country to resume bilateral relations, which had been broken off since the start of the uprising against Assad.[1] Other countries followed suit. After the earthquake that devastated parts of northern Syria and Turkey in February 2023, diplomatic developments quickly gained momentum. In May 2023, Assad participated in an Arab League summit for the first time since 2011 and Syria was reported to have been “warmly received”.[2] Turkey also made a new approach in the summer of 2024, claiming to want to re-establish relations.[3] Although Damascus did not meet the expectations of the Arab states or Turkey, hoping in particular for a return of Syrian refugees from neighbouring countries, including Lebanon, and for a stop to Fenethylline drug smuggling, the thaw was real. Riyadh was now willing, for example, to supply spare parts for Syrian aircraft, bypassing US sanctions.[4] Even in the EU, politicians began considering a resumption of contacts with Damascus as a step towards deportation of refugees.[5]
Taken by surprise
The fact that Turkey has supported the offensive by the jihadist militia Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) – alongside Ankara’s longstanding proxy the Syrian National Army (SNA) – is explained by some observes by Assad’s decision to ignore Turkey’s efforts to engage in talks. It is thought that Assad probably felt secure enough after his country’s readmission to the Arab League. When the rapid assault was unleashed the Syrian armed forces failed to put up any effective resistance against the HTS militia and quickly disintegrated. Supporters and opponents of Assad alike were taken by surprise. Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi reported at the end of last week that the inability of the Syrian Arab Army to counter the HTS offensive had caught everyone off guard. Admittedly, when Araghchi met Assad in Damascus on 1 December, the Syrian ruler had complained about incompetence and an “unwillingness” of his soldiers to fight.[6] Araghchi stated that he had gained the impression that Syria’s president had not fully grasped the situation. While Tehran was offering to send troops to support Damascus at the beginning of last week, by Friday it had begun to evacuate its units from Syria. “We cannot fight as an advisory and support force if Syria’s army itself does not want to fight,’ Iranian analyst Mehdi Rahmati was quoted as saying.[7]
‘Scorched earth policy’
The comprehensive collapse not only of the armed forces but also of Syria’s state structures was driven in part by crippling sanctions that the European Union, the United States and other Western players have imposed on the country by since summer 2011 and increasingly tightened into a stranglehold. As early as 2015, the renowned medical journal The Lancet wrote, “Sanctions are among the biggest causes of suffering for the people of Syria and a major factor perpetuating the conflict.” The UN Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures, Idriss Jazairy, declared in 2018 that the sanctions were having a “devastating impact on the entire economy and the daily lives of ordinary people.”[8] In 2019, the European Council on Foreign Relations judged that the coercive measures should be regarded as a “scorched earth policy” that “indiscriminately and arbitrarily punishes ordinary Syrians”.[9] An analysis published in July 2022 at the renowned Boston-based Tufts University pointed out that the West was not only preventing the import of food into Syria, by banning transportation and payment, it was also damaging food cultivation in the Syrian countryside by banning the import of fertilisers, irrigation pumps and fuel. According to the World Food Programme (WFP), some 12 million of the 22 million Syrians were suffering from food insecurity at the beginning of 2023, with 2.5 million even slipping into severe food insecurity.[10]
The disintegration of the army
The intention of using sanctions to push the Syrian population into hunger and revolt was clearly desired and sometimes explicitly expressed in the media. In 2020, for instance, Tagesschau, the flagship daily news programme of Germany’s public-service network said, “Poverty and hardship are making Syrians bold.”[11] Nevertheless, the fierce sanction regime alone can hardly explain the sudden collapse of the Syrian armed forces and state. Analyses of the Syrian military are emerging that reveal the details of problems and grievances. They show that military reforms were formally launched but very poorly implemented. Many soldiers with combat experience were being kept merely as reservists, so could not be mobilised quickly enough. Above all, widespread corruption and other criminal activities had become rife in the units over recent years. Internal complaints from individual soldiers show, for example, their commanders were demanding money for approval to take leave. The situation led to dissatisfaction among the troops and a willingness to raise funds illegally, such as through smuggling or the plundering of farms. As apathy spread, opposition activists were able to gain positions in the armed forces. The consequences were fatal in the face of the Turkey-backed HTS offensive. Numerous corrupt commanders also fled without a fight.[12] Under such circumstances the collapse of the armed forces – and the apparatus of government – was only a matter of time.
Targeting by Israel
Israel openly boasts a major role in the fall of Assad. The collapse of Syria’s armed forces and state structures was “the direct result of our forceful action against Hezbollah and Iran, Assad’s main supporters,” declared Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Sunday: “It set off a chain reaction of all those who wanted to free themselves from this tyranny and its oppression.”[13] Indeed, Israel not only hit Hezbollah positions but also the Syrian armed forces themselves with airstrikes on Syria in time with the Islamist assault. According to correspondent reports, there were “one or two dozen attacks a day that were simply not reported”.[14] The concerted strikes on roads connecting Syria and Lebanon clearly made it much more difficult to bring in reinforcements. However, the statements by Iran’s Foreign Minister Araghchi show that it was not so much the lack of external support but the disintegration of the Syrian armed forces that was so decisive in allowing the HTS militia to march through from Idlib to Damascus in just eleven days. The persistent airstrikes with which Israel bombarded Syria destroyed important but not decisive military potential.
‘Conciliatory fighter’
The jihadist organisation HTS now presents itself as the power in Damascus. According to public-service broadcaster ZDF, its leader Abu Muhammad al Julani has “transformed himself from a jihadist into a moderate and conciliatory fighter”.[15] german-foreign-policy.com will report shortly.
More on this topic: Syrien am Abgrund.
[1] See also: The Failure of the Regime Change Policy.
[2] Assad gets warm reception as Syria welcomed back into Arab League. aljazeera.com 19.05.2023.
[3] Burcu Ozcelik: Explaining the Diplomatic Rush to Normalise Syria’s Assad. rusi.org 06.08.2024.
[4], [5] Steven Heydemann: Syria normalization: The failure of defensive diplomacy. brookings.edu 02.08.2024.
[6] Farnaz Fassihi, Leily Nikounazar: Stunned Iranian Officials Try to Distance Their Country From Assad. nytimes.com 08.12.2024.
[7] Farnaz Fassihi, Ronen Bergman: Iran Begins to Evacuate Military Officials and Personnel From Syria. nytimes.com 06.12.2024.
[8] See also: Hoffen auf die Hungerrevolte.
[9] Nour Samaha: The economic war on Syria: Why Europe risks losing. ecfr.eu 11.02.2019.
[10] See also: Sanctions on Emergency Aid.
[11] Jürgen Stryjak: Armut und Not machen Syrer mutig. tagesschau.de 15.06.2020.
[12] Gregory Waters: The Slow Collapse of the Syrian Army. syriarevisited.substack.com 04.12.2024.
[13] Patrick Kingsley: Israel claims credit for al-Assad’s ouster, but sees risk in his absence. nytimes.com 09.12.2024.
[14] Christoph Ehrhardt: Druck auf Assad von vielen Seiten. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 29.11.2024.
[15] “Er nutzt eine Sprache der Versöhnung und Toleranz”. zdf.de 08.12.2024.