Europe’s Role in the War against China

Germany’s leading foreign policy magazine proposes massive rearmament in favor of the militarization of the Asian-Pacific region. Expert: the term Indo-Pacific is closely affiliated with plans to maintain US hegemony.

BERLIN/WASHINGTON (own report) – Germany’s leading foreign policy journal proposes comprehensive rearmament of Germany and the rest of Europe in favor of a vigorous militarization of the Asia-Pacific region. According to the magazine “Internationale Politik,” published by the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), European states must rapidly build up their armed forces and take control not only of their own continent, but also “the Mediterranean, as well as the Red Sea and the Bab al Mandab Strait, if necessary” to “reduce the need for US troops in Europe.” If this succeeds, the United States would have sufficient military capacity available should “war break out in the Indo-Pacific.” European countries should also prepare for possible war against China by increasing their defense industrial capacities to replace spent US ammunition if necessary. Experts are noticing that even among the countries of the Asian-Pacific region, there is a growing shift away from the declining Western domination and a growing “Asianization” of their military relations.

Independent Foreign Policy

Calls for a reinforced German and European military presence in the Asian-Pacific region are prompted, on the one hand, by the escalating power struggle between the West and China, and on the other, by the realization that the countries of the region are increasingly rejecting the declining Western domination and opting for their own formulations of military-policy. Felix Heiduk, Director of the Asia Research Group at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), describes this trend as the “Asianization” of the regional “security architecture.”[1] Indonesia provides a current example. Since 2007, that country has been regularly staging maneuvers with the United States – the latest from August 26 to September 6, 2024.[2] In the meantime, it has expanded its military relations and is increasingly working together with Russia. He considers “Russia, a great friend” and seeks “to expand” its relations with Moscow, proclaimed Prabowo Subianto back in July – at the time, the country’s defense minister and today it’s president – on the occasion of a meeting with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin.[3] Last week, Russia and Indonesia held their first joint maneuvers. In Jakarta, it was expressed that this is an indication of the country’s independent foreign and military policy that it intends to pursue in the future.

“Indo-Pacific”– a Confrontational Concept

For several years, demands to expand military activities to include the Asian-Pacific region are usually formulated in reference to the term “Indo-Pacific.” As Heiduk explicitly points out in the current issue of “Internationale Politik,” this term is a neologism that is “neither geographical in nature nor value-neutral,” but “thoroughly political.”[4] “The concept of a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific‘ that the USA adopted from Japan,” Heiduk explains, “is aimed at containing China, to maintain US hegemony in Asia” and is “inextricably connected to the growing strategic rivalry between Washington and Peking.” “Germany is now also situating itself within this geopolitically-perceived context,” continues the SWP expert. Heiduk points to the Asian-Pacific cruises in 2021 and 2024 taken by German warships as well as the maneuvers in Australia and other countries of the Asian-Pacific region by the German air and ground forces. These are carried out in the framework of Berlin’s official “Indo-Pacific Strategy,” the US confrontational concept for the great power struggle with China that Germany has officially adopted.[5]

“Underfunded and Overstretched”

In his article, published in the current edition of “Internationale Politik,” Max Bergmann, an expert at the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), gives exemplary expression to the growing pressure for an expansion of the militarization of the Asian-Pacific region. As Bergmann writes, the European states – he explicitly includes non-EU countries such as Great Britain and Norway – lack “hard power.”[6] “Over the past two decades” Europe has “underfunded its military to such an extent,” that its priority must be the “rebuilding of its ground forces,” he says in his article. In addition, global military powers such as Great Britain or France are completely overstretched.” They dispose of powerful weapons systems – particularly submarine warfare systems – but “both countries’ militaries … are too sparsely deployed.” Even though, for European countries the priority is currently to be militarily prepared for war with Russia, Bergmann considers that in spite of this, the continent could still play “an important security policy role in the Indo-Pacific,” in the long term.

Ammunition for the War

The CSIS-expert proposes six measures. The first would be to “reduce the necessity for US troop presence in Europe”, Bergmann explains. “Europe’s greatest contribution … would be “to secure the European continent, the Mediterranean as well as, if necessary, the Red Sea and the Straits of Bab al Mandab.”[7] The USA could then completely devote itself to its deployment in the Asian-Pacific region. “A war in the Indo-Pacific” would require “the full capacity of the United States,” the article continues. It would force the United States to relocate military assets from Europe to the Asian-Pacific region and to dedicate “its entire production of arms materials to the logistics of its armed forces in the Indo-Pacific.” This, he says, can only be possible, if Europe has been considerably strengthened militarily. In that case, however, the European states would probably also be in a position to support the USA by supplying weapons or ammunition in case of war with China. “War simulations” performed by the CSIS have demonstrated that the US armed forces would “quickly deplete their stocks of precision-guided munitions” in any conflict. Europe could join as an alternative supplier.

No “Third Way” for Europe

Bergmann also proposes additional supporting functions for European states. For example, they should develop “diplomatic and security policy ties” with countries, with which the USA can only cooperate with limitations – such as Vietnam, which obviously has difficulties “completely overcoming the historical ballast.”[8] Of course, this does not mean that Europe should adopt a “Gaullist third way approach between the USA and China.” After all, Europe’s “interests” correspond to the “strategic interests of the USA.” Europe should also consequently advocate for a “Rules-Based International Order” – all the more so, since it could “cause diplomatic embarrassment,” if the United States would do so. The European states should additionally build up close military-political and arms-industrial ties to the Asian-Pacific region and ultimately reinforce their own military presence in the region. “It could be most effective,” suggests Bergmann, “if Europe would establish a naval mission in the region,” wherein all “European naval activities would be coordinated under the EU flag.” This would make it possible to successfully counter the People's Republic of China – at least militarily.

 

[1] Felix Heiduk: Militärdiplomatie und Machtpolitik: Die Bundeswehr im Indo-Pazifik. In: Internationale Politik, November/Dezember 2024. S. 62-65.

[2] Isaac Copeland: Super Garuda Shield 2024: Highlighting multinational partnerships, joint interoperability. army.mil 06.09.2024.

[3] Russische Marine übt in Java-See. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 05.11.2024. See also Kriegsübungen in Südostasien (II).

[4] Felix Heiduk: Militärdiplomatie und Machtpolitik: Die Bundeswehr im Indo-Pazifik. In: Internationale Politik, November/Dezember 2024. S. 62-65.

[5] See Deutschland im Indo-Pazifik (I).

[6], [7], [8] Max Bergmann: Europas militärische Rolle im Indo-Pazifik. In: Internationale Politik, November/Dezember 2024. S. 56-61.


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