‘In Germany’s national interest’ (II)

Since the 1950s

The first German arms exports to Israel took place in the early 1950s. At that time, the young Federal Republic did not even have diplomatic relations with Israel. Initially, German companies supplied so-called dual-use products, such as tracks for tracked vehicles.[1] This was followed by supplies of larger systems in 1956/57, starting with two patrol boats from Jacht & Bootswerft Burmester in Bremen for the Israeli navy. In August 1962, Federal Chancellor Konrad Adenauer approved major supply contracts, including speedboats, helicopters and tanks worth 240 million deutschmarks, according to a brief account of arms cooperation between the two countries from 2003.[2] These confidential deliveries only became known a little later, leading to unfavourable responses from the Arab world to Bonn’s role. The Federal Republic then shifted to the delivery of less conspicuous military hardware, such as radio and radar equipment or components such as engines. Occasionally, both sides arranged detours for arms supplies. For example, the Israeli navy received submarines that were manufactured in the UK at Vickers Shipyards in Barrow-in-Furness, from 1973 to 1977 but built “in accordance with German plans and by German engineers”, the authors of a more detailed study have stated.[3]

Second largest arms supplier

Particularly in the initial phase, West German arms deliveries were of the utmost importance to the Israeli armed forces, which had yet to build up their large arsenals. For the Federal Republic of Germany, in turn, they provided the legitimacy needed for a gradual reestablishment of its own arms industry, emerging from the shadow of the Nazi past. Sophisticated arms exports continued after 1990. During the two Iraq wars, in 1991 and 2003, the Federal Republic exported eight Fuchs NBC armoured reconnaissance vehicles and several Patriot anti-aircraft batteries. Otherwise, its main contribution was the supply of warships, which proved particularly important for Israel but were not much use against the Palestinians. This aspect made it easier for Bonn, and later Berlin, to legitimise German weapons exports. Meanwhile, key components were and continue to be supplied. The Israeli Merkava 4 tanks, for example, which are used in the Gaza war and are also likely to be deployed in the event of a possible invasion of Lebanon, are equipped with German MTU engines and German Renk-built transmissions.[4] The important role played by German supplies to the Israeli military is shown by the findings of the Stockholm-based research institute SIPRI. The statistics show that Germany was Israel’s second-largest weapons supplier after the United States in the years from 2019 to 2023, providing a 30 per cent share.[5]

The origin of the smoothbore cannon

Cooperation between the two countries in arms research and development also played an important role from quite early on. This aspect distinguishes Germany’s defence relations with Israel from many other countries that are only importers of German weapons. As early as the 1950s, the German military gained its first insights into Soviet weapons systems when Israel was able to capture such armaments from neighbouring Arab states. It granted access to German experts. This gave German arms manufacturers an important insight: the NATO standard 105 mm calibre artillery and tank gun of the day could not destroy Soviet T-62 tanks with sufficient success. As a result, the Leopard 2 was equipped with a 120 mm smoothbore cannon for more effective amour piercing.[6] The knowledge gained by the West German arms industry has, in turn, also benefited the Israeli industry. In the 1970s, Bonn commissioned the Israeli defence industry to develop a radar jammer for its Tornado fighter jets. This made it possible to engage targets far behind the front line. The Israeli Air Force first tested the system in 1982 during the Lebanon War and, according to one study, “destroyed 16 Syrian air defence batteries in one day and shot down more than 120 Syrian fighter jets without suffering any losses.”[7]

Joint ventures

The cooperation has also benefited the German airforce. The study finds that German warplanes used Israeli technology, such as “in electronic warfare during air missions in the Yugoslavian conflict and in Kosovo in the 1990s”.[8] In particular, the Israeli defence industry began to specialise in high-tech components “in the fields of avionics, sensor technology, communication electronics and electronic warfare”. German and Israeli companies now began to set up joint ventures, some designed to market Israeli technology in Europe. For example, Rheinmetall De Tec and Israel Military Industries founded a joint venture in 1996 for the joint development of new ammunition types. And Zeiss Optronics and Rafael, a Haifa-based arms manufacturer jointly offered reconnaissance and targeting systems. The RecceLite reconnaissance system then became an export success. Close cooperation has never stopped. Today, the Bundeswehr leases Israeli Heron drones, and procures the Israeli Arrow 3 defence system as part of a joint European air defence system currently under development.[9] From Berlin’s perspective, this is not a case of simply turning to a non-EU source for defence products but growing a strong and mutually beneficial armaments relationship over the long term.

‘No stop to export licences’

The historian Marcel Serr, who spent time researching at the University of Haifa, says that German-Israeli armaments cooperation has always been based on the national interests of both sides. As early as the 1950s, “both states ... had important security policy interests” in pursuing this cooperation: “Israel needed weapons as quickly as possible in order to be able to hold its own against the neighbouring Arab states.” Germany, on the other hand, was “urgently seeking intelligence on Soviet weapons systems” in order “to prepare itself militarily as a frontline state in the Cold War.”[10] The “ongoing arms cooperation” was one motive that led Germany – “against the European mainstream” – to become a loyal supporter of Israel in its attempts to crush the Palestinians. It is true that German arms exports to Israel, which totalled 326.5 million euros last year, have fallen to almost zero since the beginning of the year, mainly due to legal challenges. The Federal Economics Ministry, which is responsible for licensing, has made it clear that there is “no stop to the licensing of arms exports to Israel, nor will there be any stop.”[11] The closely woven German-Israeli arms cooperation is, in fact, increasingly accompanied by direct military cooperation – a further intensification of bilateral relations. german-foreign-policy.com will report shortly.

More on this topic: ‘In Germany’s national interest’.

[1], [2] Marcel Serr: Zur Geschichte der deutsch-israelischen Rüstungskooperation. In: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte. Heft 6/2015. 2nd Februar 2015. pp. 23-29.

[3] Otfried Nassauer, Christopher Steinmetz: Rüstungskooperation zwischen Deutschland und Israel. Berliner Informationszentrum für Transatlantische Sicherheit. Research Report 2003.1. Berlin, September 2003.

[4] Otfried Nassauer: Besondere Bezieungen. Die deutsch-israelische Rüstungskooperation. bits.de Februar 2010.

[5] Report: German Arms Exports to Israel 2003-2023. Forensis. Berlin, 2 April 2024.

[6], [7], [8] Marcel Serr: Zur Geschichte der deutsch-israelischen Rüstungskooperation. In: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte. Heft 6/2015. 2nd Februar 2015. pp. 23-29.

[9] See also: Festtage für die Rüstungsindustrie (III).

[10] Marcel Serr: Zur Geschichte der deutsch-israelischen Rüstungskooperation. In: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte. Heft 6/2015. 2nd Februar 2015. pp. 23-29.

[11] Krieg in Nahost: Seit März kein Export von Kriegswaffen nach Israel mehr. tagesspiegel.de 19.09.2024.