Attacks in the Sahel
Berlin intensifies debate on its Sahel policy. In Mali and Niger, speculation persists about possible foreign involvement in attacks on pipelines and military forces. Kiev acknowledges its support for attacks on Malian-Russian troops.
BAMAKO/NIAMEY/BERLIN (own report) – German government advisors are intensifying their debate on adjustments to Germany’s policy for gaining influence in the Sahel. In reference to the fact that in Central Sahel nations coup governments are in power, a recent study by the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) proposes that in the future, it must be “more clearly defined” which regional forces will be considered “legitimate.” According to the authors, already in the past, Berlin had opted for “cooperation with the civilian population,” while Paris had favored “harsh punishment of the junta” in Mali and in Niger. The debate continues, while in the Sahel it is speculated that the recent attacks by the Tuareq separatists on Malian soldiers and Russian militia cannot be solely the work of pro-al Qaeda jihadis, but are possibly carried out also with French involvement. In Niger, an opposition group intent on overthrowing the government by force, was founded in Paris. At the same time, the Ukrainian intelligence service declared that it had participated in last week’s Tuareg attack on Malian and Russian targets.
Tuareg Separatists
The Malian armed forces have been fighting for some time to re-establish the Bamako government's control over the entire country. The control over the north was lost following the Tuareg revolt in 2012 and could not be regained throughout the period of the dominant presence of European armed forces. In November last year, the Malian armed forces, supported by Russian militia, successfully re-captured the desert town of Kidal in the far north, a well-known stronghold of separatist Tuareg clans.[1] Last week, Malian soldiers, again with the support of Russian militias, were in the process of taking control of villages north of Kidal, directly at the border with Algeria – some having been beyond Malian government control for decades.[2] Toward the middle of the week, fierce fighting broke out near the border town of Tinzaouatene. It is not entirely clear, whether the Malian-Russian troops were simply ambushed or had been surprised by a sandstorm.[3] What is certain, however, is that Tuareg militias succeeded in killing a large number of Malian and Russian military personnel and seizing or at least destroying a large amount of military equipment.
Cooperation with jihadis
Besides the question of how the massive strike against the Malian-Russian troops was carried out in detail, it is widely debated in the Sahel whether the Tuareg militias of the CSP-DPA (Cadre stratégique permanent pour la défense du peuple de l'Azawad) had acted independently or whether they had had support from third parties. It is known that the jihadis of the GSIM (Groupe de soutien à l'islam et aux musulmans), which cooperates with Al Qaeda, have publicly admitted that they had been involved in the attack,[4] which the CSP-DPA denies. However, it is significant that the Tuareg clan leader, Iyad ag Ghali is based in the region around Tinzaouatene.[5] Ag Ghali has acted as the head of the GSIM since it’s founding in 2017. There have been reports of a certain degree of cooperation between the CSP-DPA and the GSIM for some time.[6] Close cooperation between Tuareg and jihadis is also known from the 2012 war in Mali. Besides this, there is speculation about whether the Tuareg of the CSP-DPA are being supported by France in some form or another. This was pointed out over the weekend by Senegalese journalist Adama Gaye – who had lived in exile until early April due to his political convictions.[7] However, there is no evidence of French support for the Tuareg.
Founded in Paris
However, back in August of last year, the case of Rhissa ag Boula had already raised questions about French involvement in the Sahel. Ag Boula, a leader of the Tuareg in Niger, had been involved in uprisings against the government in Niamey in the 1990s and in the 2000s, but he was later given a ministerial post under President Mohamed Bazoum, who was a close ally of Paris.[8] On August 8, 2023 – barely two weeks after the coup against Bazoum – ag Boula announced, in Paris, the founding of the Conseil de la résistance pour la République (CRR) – an organization that aims to help Bazoum return to office. When asked whether he was prepared to wage an armed struggle to reach this objective, ag Boula explained that there were around 2,000 Tuareg in Libya and others in Sudan and the Central African Republic that he could mobilize at any time. The coup government in Niamey must be overthrown militarily, ag Boula was quoted saying, adding: “France must not leave Niger.”[9] He denied the obvious assumption that he was coordinating with government agencies in Paris. In the meantime, his CRR is cooperating in the Nigerien underground with the Front patriotique de libération (FPL), another group seeking to return Bazoum to power. On June 16, the FPL carried out an attack with explosives that damaged an important pipeline that exports Nigerien oil – a significant source of income for Niamey.[10]
With Support from Kiev
Independently of this, GUR, Ukraine’s military intelligence service, claims to have supported the CSP-DPA - and its suspected jihadi co-fighters - in their attack on the Malian-Russian troops. Andriy Yusov, a spokesman for GUR, the Ukrainian military intelligence service said “the [Tuareg] rebels received intelligence” from them; the Kyiv Post published a photo that allegedly shows Tuareg fighters holding a Ukrainian flag next to an Azawad flag for the camera following last week's attack.[11] In this case, as well, the authenticity of the photo and the veracity of the information cannot be verified. However, it is known from excerpts from previously secret US documents, leaked in April 2023, that GUR Chief, Kirilo Budanov, once planned an attack on Russian militia stationed in Mali.[12] It had already been reported several times previously that Ukrainian special forces were deployed in Sudan; they attacked Russian militias in that civil war – possibly with snipers – or trained soldiers of the Sudanese armed forces.[13] Ulf Laessing from the Sahel Program at the CDU-affiliated Konrad Adenauer Foundation has now described the political objective: “Other countries courted by Russia” should think more carefully in the future about whether they really want to use the services of Russian militias.[14]
“Punish the Junta”
The question of possible foreign support for attacks and assaults in the Sahel also arises against the backdrop of the current debate in Berlin on options for future influence in the region. For example, a recent study by the German German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) argues that, following the coups, particularly in Mali and Niger, it is up for discussion, whether the previous efforts to support those governments in their fight against jihadis can be continued.[15] Berlin had tried this in Niger, in order to save its base in Niamey, but failed.[16] The German government must “define more clearly” in the future, which regional forces in the Sahel will be considered “legitimate,” the DGAP now argues. The think tank formulates a few general guidelines and calls for “more clarity” regarding the “prioritization of security cooperation between coup governments” – for example in Mali and Niger – “and Russia.” Last but not least, it notes that already following the second coup in Mali, Berlin had focused on “cooperation with the civilian population,” while Paris wanted to “punish the junta.”[17] After the coup in Niger, according to the DGAP, the French government also focused on “harsh punishment of the junta and military intervention.”[18] Unlike in Côte d'Ivoire in 2010[19], however, it proved unsuccessful.
[1] See also On the path towards autonomy (II).
[2] Samuel Benshimon: Mali : Les forces armées maliennes reprennent Boghassa et Inafarak dans le nord du pays. sahel-intelligence.com 25.07.2024.
[3] Claudia Bröll, Friedrich Schmidt: Im Wüstensturm gefallen. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 30.07.2024.
[4] Nord du Mali : les séparatistes disent avoir remporté une « victoire éclatante » sur les Fama et sur Wagner. jeuneafrique.com 29.07.20240.
[5] L'armée malienne et Wagner repoussés par un groupe armé touareg. mondafrique.com 26.07.2024.
[6] Mali : le rapprochement entre terroristes et Touaregs confirme la stratégie du pouvoir. malijet.com 23.05.2024.
[7] Mali rebels claim major victory over army, Russia's Wagner group. aljazeera.com 28.07.2024.
[8] Mathieu Olivier: Coup d'État au Niger : Rhissa Ag Boula crée un Conseil de la résistance pour la République. jeuneafrique.com 09.08.2023.
[9] Elise Barthet: Putsch au Niger : « Nous sommes prêts à entrer en guerre », menace un ministre du président Bazoum. lemonde.fr 14.08.2023.
[10] Victor Avendaño: Qu'est-ce que le FPJ, nouvel ennemi de la junte au Niger? jeuneafrique.com 26.06.2024.
[11] Marc Bennetts, Jane Flanagan: Ukraine 'helped' Mali rebel attack that killed dozens of Wagner fighters. thetimes.com 29.07.2024.
[12] Shane Harris, Isabelle Khurshudyan: At U.S. behest, Ukraine held off anniversary attacks on Russia. washingtonpost.com 24.04.2023.
[13] Exclusive: Ukraine's special services 'likely' behind strikes on Wagner-backed forces in Sudan, a Ukrainian military source says. edition.cnn.com 20.09.2023. Ukraine Fights Russia in Sudan. english.aawsat.com 09.03.2024.
[14] Claudia Bröll, Friedrich Schmidt: Im Wüstensturm gefallen. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 30.07.2024.
[15] Florence Schimmel, Marco Schäfer, Marie Wredenhagen: Stabilisierungspolitik nach den Coups im Sahel. DGAPanalyse Nr. 6. Berlin, Juni 2024.
[16] See also Westafrikas Kampf um Souveränität (II).
[17] Florence Schimmel, Marco Schäfer, Marie Wredenhagen: Stabilisierungspolitik nach den Coups im Sahel. DGAPanalyse Nr. 6. Berlin, Juni 2024.
[18] See also After Us the Conflagration.
[19] See also Spiel mit dem Feuer.
