Russia’s red lines

Keep testing the limits

The question of where Russia’s red lines lie and what happens when they are crossed has been on the minds of Western leaders since the start of the war in Ukraine. Initially, it was unclear how the Russian government would react if the West supplied Ukraine with battle tanks, then came the question of shorter-range missiles and even fighter jets. The United States soon began to test out Russian resolve. In June 2023, the Washington Post noted that the US had gradually introduced HIMARS multiple rocket launchers into the battlefield, along with missiles of increasing range. Abrams battle tanks were supplied, followed by helicopters. Washington even resolved to try supplies of fourth-generation F-16 fighter jets. The journal took the view that Moscow had so far swallowed everything and would continue to back down. The general assumption in the West was that this pattern would prevail. Yet many experts were warning that a deadly risk remained and, indeed, was growing with every new step. “The problem is that we don’t know the actual red line, and it can change from one day to the next,” explained Maxim Samorukov of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace at the time.[1] Alexander Gabuev from the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Centre in Berlin agreed: “Certain red lines exist” but “because we don’t have a way to know for sure, that’s what creates risk.”

‘Direct involvement’ in the war

Long-range weapons capable of striking targets in Moscow and deep into the Russian hinterland have been a key factor in the debate over Russia’s red lines for years. In mid-September 2024, President Vladimir Putin stated that should Western countries supply Ukraine with long-range missiles, Moscow would regard this as “direct involvement” by NATO states in the war. Not least, this is because such missiles can only be deployed using Western satellite data and with guidance from Western military specialists. So if Kyiv were to use them, Putin stressed, their introduction would “substantially change the very essence, the nature of the conflict.”[2] But hardliners in the West urged leaders to ignore Putin’s remarks. These were, they assured, nothing more than a bluff. There should, they argued, be no hesitation in supplying long-range missiles.[3] As early as 2023, the UK and France began supplying export versions of the Storm Shadow and Scalp missiles respectively, with a range of up to 290 kilometres. They did, however, prohibit their use against targets in the Russian heartland, while agreeing to strikes on targets on disputed territory such as facilities in Crimea. By the end of 2024, the UK was then authorising attacks on targets located in what is indisputably Russian territory, initially in the Kursk region.[4]

Dragged into the war

The debate on military involvement now centres in particular on the use of long-range drones. In recent weeks, Ukraine has succeeded in inflicting significant damage on Russia with drone strikes, hitting oil refineries, airfields and online retailer warehouses, all located deep within the Russian hinterland. It is proven that long-range drones of British manufacture were used in these attacks, which targeted oil refineries in Volgograd and Yaroslavl, located some 340 and 700 kilometres respectively from the Russian border.[5] The Sunday Times dryly notes that, “military analysts and experts have stated that Russia could target British military facilities in Ukraine and beyond,” after all, the UK’s military complex is supporting the Ukrainian offensive by enabling these deep drone strikes.[6] Moscow was reiterating its warnings back in April. It noted that Ukrainian drone manufacturers had begun producing long-range drones thanks to their new joint ventures with companies in Western European countries. This, Moscow said, could only be interpreted as a “deliberate move” to assist attacks on Russian territory, meaning that Western Europe would be “dragged into a war with Russia”. Long-range drones specifically designed for Ukrainian deployment are being produced in Germany, too.[7]

Seizing ships

Then there is the question of potential piracy against Russia on the high seas. West European powers, and most recently the EU itself, have stepped up actions against merchant vessels serving Russia. Since they are no longer insured in the West and are not permitted to call at ports in European NATO member states, they are labelled a “shadow fleet”. In fact, like all other ships worldwide, they are entitled under current maritime law to freedom of navigation across the world’s oceans, including straits (as reported by german-foreign-policy.com [8]). Yet France, the UK, Sweden and Germany in particular – and, most recently, under EU auspices – have begun boarding them under various pretexts and forcibly detaining them, at least for a time. In June, for example, British soldiers boarded a Russian tanker as it was sailing through the English Channel.[9] While London is claiming to have found legal justification for this action, Moscow insists that this act constitutes piracy under maritime law. In July, the Russian navy responded by conducting a manoeuvre involving live fire some forty nautical miles south of Plymouth.[10] This show of strength is technically compliant with international maritime law. On Tuesday, Western warships taking part in the EU’s Operation Irini seized a Cameroon-flagged tanker in the Mediterranean on the grounds that it was part of Russia’s “shadow fleet” avoiding sanctions. This is reportedly the sixth such interception to date.[11]

‘Semi-military measures’ possible

The situation recently came to a head when the UK’s new prime minister, Andy Burnham, announced at the end of August that the UK would hand over the blueprints for its Storm Shadow missiles to Kiev so that Ukraine could independently manufacture the weapon and hit Russia hard. The Russian President’s spokesperson Dmitry Peskov subsequently confirmed that, in Moscow’s legal interpretation, the United Kingdom was clearly “participating in this war”.[12] A Russian government adviser, Andrei Fedorov, explained that “sooner or later, there might be not only verbal but maybe some visible reaction from Russia.” He said various options were under discussions as to the form retaliation might take. Consideration could be given to cyber-attacks, albeit deniable since carried out by hackers not officially affiliated with the Kremlin. Political responses were, of course, also conceivable: “I cannot exclude one hundred per cent,” Fedorov went on to say, “that there might be some semi-military measures.”[13] For instance, “something might happen with the enterprises, with the factories which are producing drones for Ukraine.” Nor did the Kremlin wish to rule out asymmetric responses, which would hit Western states elsewhere in retaliation for ignoring and crossing Russia’s red lines.

Violence and counter-violence

At the time of writing it has not been confirmed that the perpetrators of the botched attack on Leipzig Airport have links to Russian agencies. Russia denies responsibility, while German media point to actors with Russian passports. Should it be proven, however, this incident could indeed form part of Moscow’s response to its red lines being wilfully crossed. Further Russian counter-strikes could well follow, while initially remaining below the threshold of an open military attack by Russia on targets in German, British, French or another European territory. The upward spiral of violence and counter-violence would only continue, escalating into open warfare.

Not for the first time

The dangers of crossing red lines are not new. In the autumn of 2021, Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed that NATO issue a written rejection of Ukrainian accession to the Western military alliance. NATO membership was for Russia a step to far. Putin made it clear that this commitment by NATO was his precondition for refraining from invading Ukraine.[14] The then NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg later confirmed this sequence of events when, in September 2023, he addressed members of the European Parliament. In 2021 there was, he recalled, an opportunity to avoid crossing one of Russia’s key red lines, to enter a phase of serious diplomacy, and ultimately to prevent the outbreak of war in Ukraine. The Western states rejected this course of action. As Stoltenberg put it in 2023, “Of course, we did not sign it.”[15] The consequences are all too well known. And even worse consequences could follow before long if Russia’s red lines continue to be disregarded.

[1] John Hudson, Dan Lamothe: Biden shows growing appetite to cross Putin’s red lines. washingtonpost.com 01.06.2023.

[2] Steve Rosenberg: Putin draws new red line on long-range missiles. bbc.co.uk 13.09.2024.

[3] Walter Clemens: Why Putin’s Latest Red Line Won’t be Followed Through. cepa.org 25.09.2024.

[4] Jonathan Beale, Amy Walker: Ukraine fires UK-supplied Storm Shadow missiles at Russia for first time. bbc.co.uk 20.11.2024.

[5] Nyan One-Way Effector. drone-warfare.com 17.08.2026.

[6] Dominic Hauschild, Vika Sybir: UK drones used for ‘deep strikes’ in mainland Russia for first time. thetimes.com 15.08.2026. See also: Der Weg in den Abgrund.

[7] See: Long-range drones for Ukraine.

[8] See: Piraterie in der Ostsee, Piracy in the Baltic (II) and Piraterie in der Ostsee (III).

[9] Ben Clatworthy, Larisa Brown, Emma Yeomans: UK seizure of Russian shadow fleet vessel ‘just the beginning’. thetimes.com 14.06.2026.

[10] Charlie Parker, Marc Bennetts: Russian warship fires live weaponry close to UK coast. thetimes.com 21.07.2026.

[11] Nathan Rennolds: EU stoppt mutmaßlichen Schattenflotten-Tanker im Mittelmeer. de.euronews.com 01.09.2026.

[12], [13] Kremlin adviser warns UK drone factories could face attacks. aljazeera.com 25.08.2026.

[14], [15] Opening remarks by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the joint meeting of the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) and the Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE) followed by an exchange of views with Members of the European Parliament. nato.int 07.09.2023.