The road to the bomb
Where is the debate over German or European nuclear armament heading? A German atom bomb cannot be ruled out, but experts in Berlin advise initial caution.
BERLIN/PARIS (own report) – Foreign policy experts in Berlin are advising caution when it comes to pursuing independent nuclear armament for Germany or Europe. Simply placing oneself under the French nuclear umbrella is problematic, says an analysis in the latest issue of the journal Internationale Politik, published by the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP). France’s independent nuclear strike force, the Force de Frappe, is focused on achieving deterrence by threatening the complete destruction of Russian decision-making centres. But France lacks tactical nuclear weapons, so cannot, according to the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) respond adequately to a Russian attack on Eastern Europe with these weapons. Moves by Berlin or Brussels to openly seek immediate procurement of a German or European bomb would trigger fierce resistance. And a number of other states would be encouraged to arm themselves with nuclear weapons. This is why Berlin’s think-tanks are arguing that the best approach is to secure the US nuclear umbrella for a while and, in the meantime, quietly develop Germany’s own nuclear capabilities without causing too much of a stir. In the US, foreign policy hawks are now openly discussing a nuclear first strike against China.
A French nuclear umbrella
The main option for arming the EU with nuclear weapons remains reliance on France’s nuclear weapons potential. A recent article in the Internationale Politik journal notes that Paris has been inviting European partners to bilateral dialogues since 2020 to explore France’s role in European deterrence.[1] The German government is also engaged in these talks with the French government. However, according to the Berlin-based German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) this option has some serious disadvantages. The French nuclear arsenal is specifically designed to “threaten Russia’s decision-making centres with unacceptable damage”.[2] France’s threat potential does not extend to the use of so-called tactical nuclear weapons, which Paris does not possess. So if Russia were to go, say, for tactical nuclear strikes in Eastern Europe, it is unlikely that Paris would risk “an uncontrolled escalation – thus committing national suicide – by deploying its nuclear potential,” say SWP analyst Liviu Horovitz. What is more, France – as President Emmanuel Macron reasserted most recently in May – is certainly not prepared to relinquish its sole decision-making power over the use of its nuclear weapons. Macron’s position is that Paris will, in future, remain solely in charge.[3]
A German bomb
The option of Berlin going it alone and building a German nuclear bomb is still under discussion. This path is considered costly and time-consuming. Nevertheless, according to Der Spiegel, “Berlin diplomats” do not rule out this scenario behind closed doors.[4] Of course, such a step would invite serious political upheaval and conflict. Russia, for example, would “do everything in its power to prevent such nuclear proliferation,” predicts Internationale Politik journal. And Moscow has considerable leverage in this regard thanks to its “escalation advantage through strategic and tactical nuclear weapons”.[5] As for the US, Washington would have “little interest in Europeans developing their own nuclear weapons.” If Germany, or even several European states combined, were “despite all this, to build up their own arsenals and thus ignore limitations such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty,” Internationale Politik reasons that “the consequence would be further destabilisation.” In this scenario, “it is likely that countries around the world would follow suit – resulting in an unstable, nuclear-armed Europe, unpredictable domestic and foreign policy dynamics and worldwide surge in the number of countries possessing nuclear weapons.” This path would, affirm the analysists, be extremely risky.
Proceed tactically
Internationale Politik journal identifies “three main tasks” for the Europeans.[6] “First,” the article argues, “they must try to keep the US involved in Europe’s defence as much as possible.” This is particularly important because any programme for European nuclear armament would be complicated and take a long time. So until nuclear weapons become operational the EU would, it is thought, face a gap left by the withdrawal of the US nuclear arsenal stationed in Europe. “Second, the countries of Europe must expand their conventional capabilities because they too alter Russia’s calculations.” “Third, the European should foster a comprehensive nuclear dialogue in Europe in order to review worst-case scenarios, adapt nuclear doctrines, build technological capabilities and acquire additional nuclear options.” This approach could, the analysts claim, actually enable Germany and the EU to produce their own nuclear weapons relatively quickly. “The dilemma,” concludes Internationale Politik, “is to keep the US within Europe’s deterrence while simultaneously developing alternatives – without giving Washington the impression it’s no longer needed.”
Knee-jerk rejection?
It was along these lines that German Chancellor Friedrich Merz recently responded to an initiative by Jens Spahn, the CDU/CSU parliamentary group leader in the Bundestag. Spahn had declared that Europe must become “deterrence capable”. US nuclear weapons stationed in Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy were not sufficient for this task, he said. When asked whether Germany should arm itself with nuclear weapons, Spahn replied, “I know what kind of knee-jerk rejection is triggered as I speak, but: yes, we should be discussing an independent European nuclear umbrella.” This important project, Spahn insists, would only work under German leadership: “France will almost certainly not let us touch its red button, to stay with the metaphor.”[7] Spahn admitted that nuclear armament would be expensive, but he said that “those who cannot deter with nuclear weapons” would become “a pawn in the game of global politics.” Merz responded with a warning that such a move was premature. He said that “everything must be done for the next few years, if not decades, to maintain nuclear sharing with the United States of America.” After all, it would take a long time to arm Europe with nuclear weapons. The issue of a nuclear bomb raises questions, he said, that “certainly go beyond the period in which we must, first of all, improve Europe’s defence capabilities within the existing structures,” Merz said, arguing for the long game.[8]
First-strike readiness
The narrative among European countries is centred on defence: Europe must defend itself against a Russian nuclear threat and therefore needs nuclear weapons. But in the US, security establishment specialists are openly discussing first strike options. Matthew Kroenig, for instance, of the Washington think-tank Atlantic Council speculates about China seeking a nuclear first strike. His reasoning is that when China says it would never use nuclear weapons as a matter of principle”, why is it upgrading its nuclear arsenal?[9] The fact is China, apart from India, is the only nuclear power that rules out a nuclear first strike and has declared that it would never use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear powers as a matter of principle. From his scepticism over Beijing’s first-strike refusal, Kroenig can derive his demand that the United States should be open to a nuclear first strike in the event of the People’s Republic taking back Taiwan militarily.[10] It remains unclear as to whether Germany and the EU would follow the US and also consider a doctrine of first-strike readiness once a German-European bomb has been procured.
[1] Liviu Horovitz, Claudia Major: Überleben in der nuklearen Unordnung. In: Internationale Politik, July/August 2025. pp. 32-37.
[2] Liviu Horovitz: Die erweiterte nukleare Abschreckung der USA in Europa – drei Szenarien. SWP-Aktuell 2025/A 30. swp-berlin.org 24.06.2025.
[3] Dissuasion nucléaire : sur TF1, Macron se dit “prêt à ouvrir une discussion” avec d’autres pays de l’UE. tf1info.fr 13.05.2025. See also: “Nuklear unabhängig von den USA”.
[4] Markus Becker, Bernhard Zand: Das neue Atombombenzeitalter hat längst begonnen. spiegel.de 06.07.2025.
[5], [6] Liviu Horovitz, Claudia Major: Überleben in der nuklearen Unordnung. In: Internationale Politik, July/August 2025. pp. 32-37.
[7] Spahn fordert direkteren Zugriff Deutschlands auf Atomwaffen. tagesspiegel.de 28.06.2025.
[8] Merz bremst Spahn bei Vorstoß zu europäischem Atomschutzschirm. spiegel.de 01.07.2025.
[9], [10] Markus Becker, Bernhard Zand: Das neue Atombombenzeitalter hat längst begonnen. spiegel.de 06.07.2025.
