All or nothing

‘Creeping decay’

According to the current issue of IP, the European Union has, for some time now, been characterised by “creeping decay”. Various reasons for this are advanced by DGAP analyst Josef Janning, who has been writing about the EU for decades. For one thing, he says, the “consequences of supranational political interdependence” are already being felt in everyday life, expressed above all in “distribution conflicts and crises”.[1] The impacts are often negative, especially for weaker member states and for sections of society without the advantages of national elites. This is a factor driving the trend towards a stronger role played by “right-wing national currents and parties” across Europe, notes Janning. At the same time, it should be noted that “at the latest with the failure of the Constitutional Treaty of 2004”, the goal of an “ever closer union of the peoples of Europe” has disappeared from real world of politics and is at best still only brought up in “ceremonial acts ... and coalition agreements”. But if Europe loses sight of the bigger picture, writes Janning, “even the small steps can no longer be understood and communicated”. A related problem, he notes, is the disappearance of “strategically orientated groups of states actively shaping” the Union in the face of an ever greater “heterogeneity of interests”. Last but not least, the United States has, under Trump, lost interest in a “stable, prosperous and cooperative Europe”.

Failure: a realistic scenario

Janning states that “political entities” such as the EU could “continue to exist institutionally” yet at the same time “lose their significance and integrative power”.[2] If they give up their ability to “further evolve”, or even to take effective action, they risk becoming “obsolete”. So, increasingly, we can expect to see national go-it-alones, he says. “If these trends reach the primary pillars of the EU, namely the internal market and the common currency,” continues Janning, “then the Union will tear itself apart in a plethora of multilevel internal conflicts between EU institutions and member states.” Indeed, "At no time since the 1950s has the centrifugal dynamic been stronger and more visible than in the current situation. While institutions and processes operate as usual, the substance of integration is eroding beneath the surface.” The DGAP analyst concludes that, “failure and break-up of the European Union appears for the first time as a realistic scenario.” In seeking “ways out of the erosion”, he concludes, “The EU needs a fresh start towards political union, it needs strategic thinking.” And this would involve “the question of a common defence”. Here, Janning is convinced, “Much, if not everything, depends on Germany” – the economically strongest power at the centre of Europe.

‘A Bundeswehr capable of war’

While Janning insists on addressing the “question of a common defence” to save the EU, Carlo Masala, Professor of International Politics at the Bundeswehr University in Munich, is more concrete. He wants any future German government to “realise that Germany must renew the foundations of its security and defence policy” – “and that is a Bundeswehr capable of fighting a war.”[3] What is needed, he writes, is “a substantial increase in the military budget.” Among other policies, Masala proposes “a solidarity surcharge for defence to be paid by all people who work in Germany,” which could be set at between 1 and 1.5 per cent of income tax. He also sees a significant increase in personnel numbers in the Bundeswehr as imperative, especially since there will be “a disproportionately large wave of retirements” from the armed forces in the next few years. An internal paper from the Ministry of Defence, released some time ago, was already considering, even before NATO’s spending prescriptions, a huge boost in troop numbers, from the current 180,000 to up to 440,000 soldiers. One obstacle is the 2+4 Treaty, which stipulates an upper limit of 350,000. Nonetheless, Masala says consideration must be given not only to a return to compulsory military service, which was ended in Germany in 2011, but also to a constitutional amendment to extend compulsory military service to women.

Change in mentality

Jan Techau, Director Europe at the Eurasia Group in Berlin, also speaks out in the IP journal in favour of massive rearmament. According to Techau, the next German government must “prepare the Germans, the Berlin bubble and itself ... for turning Germany into the leading European power, diplomatically and militarily.”[4] Nut the “learning process that leads to the acceptance of this role will be made considerably more difficult by the fact that it is all very, very expensive.” The next Federal Chancellor will “have to make and justify dramatic budgetary decisions”. For Techau, this is “clear to everyone involved, it’s just that nobody wanted to be caught telling the truth about this before the election.” It is now time, he believes, to prepare the conservatives “for new debts” and the left “for painful structural reforms”. Otherwise, “there is a risk of resistance and blockade". So, as Techau sees it, the “real task of the coming government” is to prepare the population for the fact that Berlin will be "forced to make some unheard-of decisions in the near future”. The author does not go into detail as to what this will mean beyond the immense costs of weapons and other military hardware. But he considers it necessary to “anchor a change in mentality, the epochal turning point (Zeitenwende), in people’s minds”.

Annoying fear

Ulrike Esther Franke, from the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), is another expert offering advice on this sea change. Franke criticises the fact that the German debate on “military matters” is “morally charged”. Military experts are, she finds, confronted with “considerable mistrust”, which “does not help to improve the climate for discussion”.[5] She writes that, in Germany, the debate on war is “driven by fear”. Such reservations are detrimental to the task of dealing with future “dangers”. However, Franke believes that thanks to the war in Ukraine Germany “has a window of opportunity in terms of public attention and willingness to deal with defence and the military.” She insists that the next government “use this to lay important foundations before the mood shifts” and concludes, “Now is the time for political leadership.”

[1], [2] Josef Janning: Scheitert Europa? In: Internationale Politik March/April 2025. pp. 72-79.

[3] Carlo Masala: Kein Geld, kein Personal, keine Sicherheit. In: Internationale Politik March/April 2025. pp. 24-27.

[4] Jan Techau: Die Realität ist schmerzhaft, aber zumutbar. In: Internationale Politik March/April 2025. pp. 18-23.

[5] Ulrike Esther Franke: Von Kriegen, Ängsten und gefährlichem Halbwissen. In: Internationale Politik March/April 2025. pp. 106-111.