‘Realpolitik’ of the ‘Zeitenwende’

Tariff deal without negotiations

A report by Sabine Weyand, then Director-General for Trade at the European Commission, details the manner in which the trade deal was reached. The deal was “agreed” on 27 July, 2025, by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and US President Donald Trump. Weyand, who is reputed to be an extremely experienced and tenacious negotiator, was also involved in the proceedings at the time. She emphasized in late August 2025 that what occurred could in no way be described as genuine negotiations: “There was no exchange of demands or offers.”[1] Rather, “the European side” had been put under “massive pressure” to “find a quick solution.” Due to the war in Ukraine, the EU felt itself at the time to be “completely dependent on the United States”. Had von der Leyen not agreed in full to the Trump administration’s demands, let alone resorted to “countermeasures”, there would have been “a risk” of the US “calling, in turn, the security partnership into question”. In her view, the Commission had therefore made a “strategic calculation” to “secure an overall political package”. This, Weyand was quoted as saying a few weeks after the deal was accepted at Trump’s privately owned Turnberry golf course in Scotland, was in fact the “Realpolitik of the Zeitenwende”, i.e. the pragmatism flowing from a new era of geopolitics and defence policy:[2] the unpalatable compromises that now had to be made.

‘Looking like idiots’

The EU’s trade deal with the U.S. was not only concluded without any serious negotiations as the EU delegation led by von der Leyen caved in completely to Trump’s demands. It is also the case that the deal, as Austrian economist Gabriel Felbermayr, who serves a member of the German Council of Economic Experts, has noted, “contravenes commitments under the World Trade Organization (WTO)”. It constitutes “a flagrant violation of WTO rules.” After all, as Felbermayr explains, the US had “committed itself under international law to keep within general automobile import tariffs of 2.5 percent” within the WTO framework. Indeed, the Turnberry deal “encourages unbridled bilateralism, which the World Trade Organization is supposed to prevent.”[3] By agreeing to Trump’s demands, the EU has become “an accomplice to an attack on the WTO.” And it has given few advantages for the European side. Firstly, the US has “gradually widened the steel and aluminium tariffs” to apply to many “other products” after the deal was done. We have risked “ending up looking like fools” if “we, for example, reduce industrial duties on American imports to zero as agreed, while the US fails to fulfil its part.”[4] And secondly, despite the disadvantageous deal, the rifts within NATO have grown ever wider. Felbermayr concludes that there are at least “doubts” as to whether the deal had “actually provided any of the security safeguards” that “we believe we need”.

In the interest of German carmakers

The European Commission President’s initially uncontested and, moreover, WTO rules-violating approval of last summer’s EU-US tariff deal was not without controversy within Europe. France, for example, voiced fierce objections. Prime Minister François Bayrou angrily declared that the deal amounted to the EU’s “subjugation” to the United States. Foreign Trade Minister Laurent Saint-Martin demanded that “the final word” on the agreement must “not yet be spoken”. If it was simply nodded through, the EU could no longer be considered an “economic power.”[5] But the protests could not prevent the push to acceptance. In part this failure was insured by the German government backing for von der Leyen, even though the deal is considered detrimental to many German corporations. The chemicals industry, for example, will be struggling to compete with US products entering the EU duty-free.[6] The main factor behind Berlin’s acceptance lies in Germany’s most important industry: the automotive sector is in the midst of an exceptionally deep crisis and is desperately trying to minimise its growing losses as quickly as possible. That industry has strongly advocated quick compliance because its major sales market is the United States. The industry hopes for a rapid reduction of Washington’s tariffs from 25 to 15 per cent and the avoidance of EU retaliatory tariffs imposed on the US. After all, the cars produced by German corporations at their US factories can also be imported into the EU duty-free.[7]

European Parliament wants safeguards

In the European Parliament the tariff deal has met with significant resistance. The vote on the deal has already been suspended twice at short notice: first in January following Trump’s blunt threat to annex Greenland; then in February following the US Supreme Court’s ruling that a large majority of the tariffs imposed by Trump were actually unlawful. On March 26, the lawmakers finally approved the deal, but subject to certain conditions. For instance, the Parliament demands that the tariffs on imports from the US may only be removed once the US has fulfilled all the deal’s provisions. And the US has not done this. Washington has successively widened the application of tariffs to goods containing even small amounts of steel and aluminium, even though this was not provided for under the deal. The European Parliament is also demanding that the trade deal be suspended if the US administration attempts to use economic pressure to extort political concessions or if certain US products flood EU markets. European lawmakers also want the system of extensive tariff-free access for imports from the US to be reviewed by March 31, 2028. If it proves to be excessively harmful to the economies of EU member states, it should, they demand, be immediately abolished.[8]

‘Just get it done’

The latest twist is that Trump now threatens to raise tariffs on EU automobile exports to the US from 15 to 25 percent. The German automotive industry and Chancellor Merz are once again urging that the existing deal be put into effect as quickly as possible. They want the EU to drop any conditions and do as Trump demands. The President of the German Association of the Automotive Industry (VDA), Hildegard Müller, is calling, for example, for the 2025 Turnberry deal to be fulfilled unconditionally: “the EU must now finally get its part of the … agreement implemented.”[9] Merz, for his part, is also criticising what he sees as foot-dragging “on the European side”. He bemoans that “new conditions are being formulated time and again.” Keen to avoid further provocations, he notes that “The Americans are ready, and the Europeans are not.” Export-oriented Germany would, he says, now like to see an agreement reached “as quickly as possible”.[10]

Postponed again

Negotiations between the European Parliament, the member state governments and the European Commission, a format known as the ‘trilogue’, concluded late Wednesday night without a final resolution. Reports following the meeting said the parties had narrowed their differences on some points. However, despite the pressure, not least from the German government, the European Parliament is still insisting on conditions to safeguard their respective economies. Talks among the EU actors are set to resume on May 19.[11]

[1], [2] Florian Eder: „Das waren keine Verhandlungen“. sz-dossier.de 26.08.2026.

[3] „Die EU macht sich zum Komplizen“. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 05.05.2026.

[4] See: Might is right.

[5] Droits de douane : François Bayrou dénonce une « soumission » après l’accord commercial entre Donald Trump et Ursula von der Leyen. lemonde.fr 28.07.2025.

[6] See: An economic power in decline.

[7] See: Im Interesse der deutschen Kfz-Industrie.

[8] Europaparlament knüpft Umsetzung von US-Zolldeal an Auflagen. zeit.de 26.03.2026.

[9] Lazar Backovic, Felix Stippler, Laurin Meyer: So hart würden Trumps neue Zölle die deutsche Autoindustrie treffen. handelsblatt.com 04.05.2026.

[10] „Trump will ganz Europa treffen“. wiwo.de 04.05.2026.

[11] Noch keine Einigung bei EU-Verhandlungen zum US-Handelsabkommen. handelsblatt.com 07.05.2026.