Fundamental Readjustment

BERLIN (Own report) - Just a few days before the NATO summit opens in Poland's capital Warsaw, German think tanks are not only pushing for stationing combat troops at Russia's borders but even for the expansion of the West's nuclear arsenal. A "revision" of NATO's "nuclear strategy" is "urgently needed," because, vis à vis Moscow, for a "credible deterrence" a "nuclear component" is necessary, explained the CDU-affiliated Konrad Adenauer Foundation. The German government's main military policy think tank, the Federal College for Security Studies (BAKS) is also calling for the transatlantic alliance to reach a "new strategic nuclear consensus," to contain Russia, the "anti-western power." The implementation of the missile defense system in NATO's eastern European member countries is also explained with Moscow's alleged "aggressivity" and the derived need for "deterrence." The western military alliance demonstrates its "political capability to take action" against Russia, by its "close involvement" of the formally neutral countries Sweden and Finland "in NATO processes," according to the author. Besides, both think tanks admit their commitment to militaristic "global crisis management." According to the Adenauer Foundation, NATO must be able to address and "neutralize threats wherever they arise." The think tank explicitly considers the "flow of migrants" in this category.

Ready to Use Nuclear Weapons

In an article, published on the eve of the NATO summit due to be held in the Polish capital, Warsaw on July 8 - 9, the CDU-affiliated Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS) has committed itself to the expansion of the western nuclear arsenal. A debate on the "purpose and condition" is "urgently needed," the author writes, after all, Russia's "credible deterrence" necessitates a "nuclear component." Apparently, the KAS is counting on a further escalation of conflicts with Moscow that can only be resolved with ostentatious readiness to use nuclear weapons. "In the case of war with Russia, the alliance's defense of the Baltic countries with solely conventional means ... would hardly be possible - the Russian military would have a numerical and geographical advantage." Therefore a fundamental "readjustment" of the transatlantic military alliance's "nuclear strategy" would be necessary, even if, in Germany, it is a "highly unpopular theme," the foundation concludes.[1]

Strategic Nuclear Consensus

Karl-Heinz Kamp, President of the Federal College for Security Studies (BAKS) holds a similar standpoint in his "working paper" on NATO's Warsaw summit. Kamp explicitly calls for "counter concepts" for the case that Russia starts a war against NATO's eastern European member countries and then attempts to "use nuclear threats to split the Alliance." The president of the German government's main military policy think tank logically favors the "shorter reaction time" necessary for the use of nuclear weapons and "stepping up military exercises in the use of nuclear weapons." Therefore, the Alliance needs to reach "a new consensus on its nuclear strategy," explains Kamp. In this context, he also points to problems this represents, for example, "although Eastern European NATO states are currently insisting on a credible form of nuclear deterrence as a means of preventing war, there is a strong anti-nuclear tradition in countries such as Germany," he notes.[2]

Security Policy Turning Point

The President of BAKS views the deployment of four NATO combat battalions in Eastern Europe, which, in all probability will be approved at the Warsaw summit, with unrestricted optimism. As Kamp points out, the western military alliance has therefore "adapted to the new global security environment" and is using a security policy of "defense, deterrence of hostile forces, and provision of assurance to allies" to "confront Russia’s geopolitical ambitions."[3] The Adenauer Foundation takes a similar position. "The security of the borders can only be assured, if Russia is made clear that any border violation will immediately involve soldiers from various NATO nations, thereby considerably expanding the number of parties to the conflict. This calls for ... a combat-ready multinational presence and reliable resupply capabilities."[4] Like the establishment of NATO's Eastern European "Spearhead" "rapid reaction force," Germany will also make "a significant contribution," (german-foreign-policy.com reported.[5]) for example the combat battalion stationed in Lithuania "could be placed under German command."[6]

"Not Destabilizing"

Whereas the Adenauer Foundation recommends that the Warsaw summit's debate on the "establishment of NATO's missile defense system in Eastern Europe be kept at low key,"[7] Kamp, President of BAKS, takes a strong stand on the issue. He sees them as a purely "defensive" measure, exclusively serving as "deterrence" of "aggressive regimes." "A potential attacker’s risk-benefit assessment changes when he believes that the adversary’s defense works (and has reason to believe so). He must expect his attack to be unsuccessful and at the same time risks acts of reprisal." Kamp sees Moscow's criticism that the missile defense system would render NATO virtually invulnerable, and thereby in a position to attack Russian territory, as bearing "traits of hysteria." Kamp considers that stationing these new weapons is not "destabilizing, but simply good sense."[8]

NATO Expansion

The President of BAKS also does not consider that the formally neutral countries Sweden and Finland being already "closely involved in NATO processes" poses a threat to Russia. On the contrary, he sees it more as a confirmation of the western alliance's "being capable of taking action."[9] In view of the Warsaw summit, the Adenauer Foundation echoes this sentiment in recommending maintaining the "idea of Europe's stabilization alive through NATO's expansion." "Ultimately, emphasis on NATO's Open Door is also an important signal to ... potential candidates, such as Sweden and Finland, who in light of the changed security situation and certain domestic conditions could possibly be knocking sooner than expected at NATO's door."[10]

NATO's Southern Flank

At the same time, considering "Russian aggression," the Konrad Adenauer Foundation sees the danger that the "pendulum" could "swing to the other extreme, by neglecting the crisis management capability beyond NATO territory." The objective remains "the neutralization of the threats to the security of the alliance, wherever they arise - before they can reach NATO territory." "The necessary measures for the eastern flank should not obscure the need for NATO on its southern flank. The instability in North Africa and the Middle East, along with the resulting flows of migrants are a particular burden on the countries along the Mediterranean." In addition, the "stabilization of Afghanistan" remains a central obligation of the western military alliance, according to the foundation. "These types of contributions to international crisis management must be discussed in Warsaw, to have the political and military operability available for the next crisis."[11]

Arms Buildup at Any Price

To prepare NATO troops for global "crisis management," the Konrad Adenauer Foundation calls on the military alliance's member states "not only to gradually change course in their defense spending, but to make a fundamental readjustment." A drastic increase in defense budgets should become particularly necessary, if NATO seeks to provide a military "response" to the civil wars in Syria and Ukraine - as the foundation proposes. According to the author, after all, as "a passive bystander" one does not "make a good impression."[12]

[1] Patrick Keller: Die NATO in Warschau. Ein Wegweiser durch die Agenda des Gipfels. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. Analysen + Argumente. Ausgabe 210, Juni 2016.
[2] Karl-Heinz Kamp: Die Agenda des NATO-Gipfels von Warschau. Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik. Arbeitspapier Sicherheitspolitik 9/2015.
[3] Karl-Heinz Kamp: Der NATO-Gipfel von Warschau. Sieben zu erwartende Botschaften. Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik. Arbeitspapier Sicherheitspolitik 18/2016.
[4] Patrick Keller: Die NATO in Warschau. Ein Wegweiser durch die Agenda des Gipfels. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. Analysen + Argumente. Ausgabe 210, Juni 2016.
[5] See 21st Century Warfare and 21st Century Warfare (II).
[6], [7] Patrick Keller: Die NATO in Warschau. Ein Wegweiser durch die Agenda des Gipfels. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. Analysen + Argumente. Ausgabe 210, Juni 2016.
[8] Karl-Heinz Kamp: Russlands NATO-Legenden. Moskaus Propaganda vor dem Gipfeltreffen. Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik. Arbeitspapier Sicherheitspolitik 15/2016.
[9] Karl-Heinz Kamp: Der NATO-Gipfel von Warschau. Sieben zu erwartende Botschaften. Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik. Arbeitspapier Sicherheitspolitik 18/2016.
[10], [11], [12] Patrick Keller: Die NATO in Warschau. Ein Wegweiser durch die Agenda des Gipfels. Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung. Analysen + Argumente. Ausgabe 210, Juni 2016.


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