NATO's Nuclear Debate

"Unrealistic" Renunciation of Nuclear Weapons

According to the German government's military policy think tank, the Federal College for Security Studies (BAKS), NATO's "nuclear strategy" should be "re-discussed" - "in view of Russia,"[1] because of Moscow's perceived "neo-imperial aggression" against Eastern Europe. "Russia has definitely backed out of the partnership [with NATO] and is defining itself as an anti-western power." This would necessitate "shortening the time of reaction" for engagement with nuclear weapons as well as "an increase of exercise activities" in the "nuclear field." It is, "in a way, ironical" that these issues should be discussed at the Warsaw NATO summit in early June, when US President Barack Obama will give his "NATO farewell address," according to BAKS. After all it was Obama, who had received the 2009 Nobel Peace Prize "for the - from today's perspective - unrealistic vision of a world free of nuclear weapons."[2]

The Deterrence Renaissance

Already early last year, BAKS stated that, after having taken a backseat for two decades, the "nuclear deterrence issue" is again "center stage," not only because of a perceived Russian "aggression against Ukraine," but also because of "Moscow's aggressive nuclear posture." Russia, according to BAKS, has "constantly reinforced and modernized" its nuclear arsenal and them in its "military scenarios." For example, in 2009, Moscow "simulated the engagement of nuclear weapons against Poland," and the corresponding maneuvers have been taking place "almost on a monthly basis" since the beginning of the Ukrainian civil war. Under these circumstances, NATO's doctrine of "nuclear deterrence" is experiencing a "renaissance," BAKS declared - just as during the cold war against the Soviet Union, western nuclear weapons have become a "means of preventing war."[3]

"Subordinated" Arms Control

As BAKS further explains, NATO can rely completely on Germany's sense of responsibility toward the alliance. The Bundeswehr will continue to provide the "delivery systems" for the Germany-based US nuclear weapons - "even if this is very costly."[4] Appropriately, the German Air Force is regularly participating in the so-called SNOWCAT exercises ("Support for Nuclear Operations With Conventional Air Tactics"), during which the crews of "Tornado" jet fighters practice nuclear attacks. In the near future, the US Army's nuclear weapons, stockpiled at the 33rd Tactical Air Force Squadron airbase in Büchel (in the state of Rhineland-Palatinate), will be equipped with new warheads. This upgrade will include a very advanced targeting system and the bombs will represent a combined destructive power 80 times greater than the bomb dropped in 1945 by the USA on the Japanese city, Hiroshima. Consequently, according to BAKS, even "nuclear arms control" has become "clearly subordinated" to the West's expansion of its nuclear arsenal. "Disarmament is not the primary raison d'être of a nuclear weapon."[5]

Practice Nuclear War

The German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) has expressed itself along the same lines taken by BAKS. For example, it is "conceivable" to "enhance the integration of nuclear weapons" in NATO's planning, "wherein stronger links are drawn between conventional and nuclear capabilities." In addition, "nuclear weapons capable systems could become more integrated in maneuver scenarios," and "maneuvers could be held more often and become more realistic." There is also the possibility that the period will be shortened "in which the US Europe-based nuclear weapons become operational." The SWP, like BAKS, does not hesitate to pin blame. These above named measures are only following the "Russian example," according to the think tank.[6]

Nuclear Alliance

The SWP devoted special attention to a UN working group, which has set the objective of making headway, in the course of this year, for the international proscription of nuclear weapons, primarily by means of a "ban treaty." It was warned that German participation in this "Open-ended Working Group" (OEWG) is not "without risks." There is a possibility "that Germany could be won over by ban treaty advocates." This would "isolate Berlin from its partners and allies," because every rule putting "nuclear deterrence" into question would be in "contradiction to NATO's role as a 'nuclear alliance'."[7] The German government already has unambiguously made its position clear on this point. In mid-2015, the group of experts commissioned by the defense ministry with formulating a new "White Paper" called on NATO to revive the anti-Soviet cold war nuclear "deterrence" doctrine - to ward off the perceived "eastern threats" emanating from Russia. (german-foreign-policy.com reported.[8])

The Right Mixture

In the meantime, leading representatives of the German military and university professors have expressed similar views. In an interview with the German press published at the end of last year, the Bundeswehr General Hans-Lothar Domröse, Commander of the Allied Joint Force Command Brunssum (Netherlands), declared that he is "very concerned" about Russian President Vladimir Putin's policy. "Now, we have to watch carefully whether we, the NATO, will not become too small and he too big. If the relations between the two become unbalanced, there is a danger that deterrence becomes shaky. On the other hand, nuclear weapons are a "component of deterrence."[9] In an article appearing at about the same time, Carlo Masala, Professor of Political Science at the Bundeswehr University in Munich, proclaimed his partisanship to the strategy of nuclear "deterrence" vis à vis Russia. This, however, must be accompanied by "proposals of cooperation," according to the scholar - adding that most important is the "right mixture."[10]

[1] Karl-Heinz Kamp: Das atomare Element im Russland-Ukraine-Konflikt. Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik, Arbeitspapier Sicherheitspolitik 3/2015.
[2] Karl-Heinz Kamp: Die Agenda des NATO-Gipfels von Warschau. Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik, Arbeitspapier Sicherheitspolitik 9/2015.
[3], [4], [5] Karl-Heinz Kamp: Das atomare Element im Russland-Ukraine-Konflikt. Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik, Arbeitspapier Sicherheitspolitik 3/2015.
[6], [7] Oliver Meier: Deutschland und die nukleare Abschreckung. Zwischen Ächtung und Aufwertung von Atomwaffen. SWP-Aktuell 97, Dezember 2015.
[8] See Modern Strategy Concept (III) and Modernes Strategieverständnis (IV).
[9] Deutscher Nato-General sieht Machtbalance in Gefahr. www.focus.de 30.12.2015.
[10] Carlo Masala: Drei großen Problemen muss sich Deutschlands Außenpolitik 2016 unbedingt stellen. www.focus.de 02.01.2016.