Crisis as Opportunity
MINSK/BERLIN (Own report) - At Berlin's insistence, the EU foreign ministers decided, Monday, to temporarily suspend EU sanctions on Belarus, at least for the next four months. Because of the Ukrainian conflict, Minsk is confronting grave economic and foreign policy difficulties. Because of Russia's economic crisis, Belarusian imports have been drastically reduced and Minsk is forced to seek alternate markets. President Alyaksandr Lukashenka is also worried that Russia's overwhelming power could threaten Belarus' independence and therefore, is actively intensifying his own foreign policy initiatives. To acquire alternate markets and maintain its independence, Minsk cannot avoid reinforcing its relations to the West. Berlin's political establishment is closely monitoring these developments. There is an opportunity for "successfully implementing structural changes" in Belarus, as experts declared just before Sunday's presidential elections. In the hope of weakening Minsk's ties to Moscow and strengthening its bonds to the western hegemonic sphere, Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier made a plea for suspending the sanctions. Berlin's political PR is ill at ease with this year's Nobel Literature Prize laureate, Svetlana Alexievich's warning to maintain sanctions - in conformity with EU policy until now.
Collateral Damages of the Ukrainian Conflict
Berlin and Brussels' considerations to loosen the sanctions imposed on Minsk must be considered in the context of developments in Belarus overshadowed by the Ukrainian conflict. This conflict has placed the country under enormous economic pressure. Russia's economy is suffering due to its loss of business with Ukraine and western sanctions. This, in turn, is also affecting Belarus, whose economy is largely dependant on Russia. In 2014, trade with its eastern neighbor accounted for 49.9 percent of the overall Belarusian foreign trade, with its exports to Russia already having dropped by 8.9 percent in comparison to 2013.[1] In the first semester of 2015, the bilateral trade volume dropped to 73.3 percent of the previous year's and exports to Russia to 66.7 percent. According to a prognosis of the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP), for the first time since 20 years, Minsk must expect a reduction of up to 2.3 percent of its economy. "Because of government programs to substitute imports, the Russian market cannot reach its 2013 size anytime soon." This is why "Belarusian foreign policy efforts must explore long-term alternate markets" - China, but also the EU and the USA. "Without profound economic modernization," this, however, would be impossible.
Pragmatic Rapprochement
Since the beginning of the Ukrainian conflict, Belarus is not only confronting economic, but complicated foreign policy problems, as well. Despite Russia's strong influence in Belarus, Minsk has been insisting on a degree of independence. Minsk had reacted negatively to overly strong Russian pressure on neighboring countries, fearing it also could come under this pressure at any time. This is why President Alyaksandr Lukashenka recognized Ukraine's putschist government last year - despite Russian insistence - and has initially supported Ukrainian territorial integrity. He also rejected Moscow's economic embargo against the West. In addition, Minsk has been making a plea for "reassessing the EU's Eastern Partnership Program" as a sort of reassurance against Moscow, according to the DGAP analysis. Since last year a certain "pragmatically motivated" rapprochement between Belarus and the EU has been taking place.[2] Minsk has now made significant concessions and "liberated all political prisoners" on August 22. "One of the main obstacles hindering intensification of political and economic cooperation with the West" has therefore been overcome.
Active Foreign Policy
"Belarus' foreign policy efforts to solve the Ukrainian crisis can be seen" in the context of Minsk's endeavors to cooperate more closely with the West, explains the DGAP analysis.[3] "The establishment of the Minsk framework as the basis of negotiations" for solving the Ukrainian conflict has "harvested two important results." First, Lukaschenka "has domestically become more popular," and secondly, with his mediation, "he has made his mark, internationally, for a more independent foreign policy within the sphere of CIS." It is not for nothing that, in late April, during his visit to Georgia, the Belarusian president declared, "he would like to be the mediator between Russia and Georgia," writes the DGAP. "Belarus seeks to pursue an active foreign policy," concludes the author of the analysis. "The Minsk framework is the foundation of Belarus' efforts to develop a foreign policy that radiates in more directions than solely toward Russia."
Sense of Urgency
This is where western strategists pick up. In the German political establishment, the Belarusian government's crisis policy is being closely monitored. "Official Minsk is, by all means, expressing its interest in normalizing relations" with the West, wrote in late 2014 the "Belarus-Analysen," published by the University of Bremen. However, the desired "foreign policy support" for Belarus in its opposition to Russia, can "only be achieved in the case of a maximum rapprochement to the EU and the USA." "At the moment, there is no reason" for hope, that Minsk would be prepared to go down this route.[4] In March 2015, "Belarus-Analysen" had been more optimistic. "The Belarusian mediator role in the Ukrainian conflict has enhanced perspectives of a fundamental improvement of relations between the EU and official Minsk," the journal wrote at the time. It remains "to be seen, whether the Belarusian leadership will continue to limit itself to finding a modus for maintaining the status quo," or whether the "pressure from reformers within the ruling elites to address the problems will be strong enough to force structural changes to be addressed ... with the active participation of actors from private sectors and civil society."[5] Immediately preceding the presidential elections, it was analyzed that even though "the regime's willingness to undertake structural reforms, for the time being, remains limited, the objective sense of urgency, as well as the expectations of the population ... have perceptibly grown." "Conditional EU policy," therefore has finally "regained a limited chance of success."[6]
Change of Course
The idea that it could be tried again to break Belarus away from Russia and pull it over into the western hegemonic sphere, now prevails in Berlin. Following an EU decision last Friday, Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier suggested the possibility of a relaxation of EU sanctions, even before yesterday's EU Foreign Ministers Meeting. Yesterday, his colleagues ruled in favor of sanctions being suspended, initially, for four months.
A Bit Too Late
Berlin's political PR is ill at ease with the newly crowned Nobel Literature Prize laureate's warning against loosening the sanctions. Lukashenka's style of government is a "soft dictatorship," declared Svetlana Alexievich last weekend. Brussels should maintain the sanctions against Belarus.[7] This is in conformity with EU policy over the past few years, but it comes a bit too late from the German/European point of view. Germany and the EU are hoping that talks at government level will incite Minsk to adapt to the West. The Belarus opposition, which Berlin and Brussels' propaganda until now had been focused on, will soon be pushed into the wings of the debate.
[1], [2], [3] Maria Davydchyk: Emanzipationskurs mit Hindernissen. DGAPanalyse Nr. 12, Oktober 2015.
[4] Andrej Fjodarau: Wachsende Angst vor Souveränitätsverlust. Belarus-Analysen Nr. 19, 17.12.2014.
[5] Astrid Sahm: Nach Minsk-2. Belarus-Analysen Nr. 20, 23.03.2015.
[6] Astrid Sahm: Belarus vor den Präsidentschaftswahlen: Zwischen Stagnation und Wandel. Belarus-Analysen Nr. 22, 25.09.2015.
[7] EU will Sanktionen gegen Lukaschenko aussetzen. www.zeit.de 12.10.2015.
