Between the USA and China

NATO-Japanese Cooperation

German government advisors are calling for enhancing NATO-Japanese cooperation, which had officially begun on July 2, 1990 with the first "NATO-Japan-Conference," when Manfred Wörner (CDU), NATO's General Secretary at the time, received the Japanese foreign minister at NATO Headquarters in Brussels. In the 1990s, Tokyo had financially supported NATO operations in Southeastern Europe. Japanese support for NATO's intervention in Afghanistan became the "catalyst" for cooperation, explains the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP).[1] The January 12, 2007 meeting of Japanese Prime Minster, Shinzo Abe, with NATO General, Secretary Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, led to the western war alliance's decision (March 7, 2007) to enhance its cooperation. In 2010, Tokyo began supporting NATO's vessels combating piracy at the Horn of Africa. On April 15, 2013, NATO and Japan agreed in a "Joint Political Declaration" on concrete steps to enhance cooperation, including "counter terrorism," "cyber-defense" and "maritime security."[2]

The Allies' Decisions

The "Joint Political Declaration" is of particular importance, because Japan is laying claim to a small group of islands in the East China Sea - the Diaoyu Islands (Japanese: Senkaku Islands), which belonged already to China under the Qing Dynasty (1644 - 1911), as the political scientist from Taipei, Shaosheng Tang explained in a recent publication of the CSU affiliated Hanns Seidel Foundation.[3] Towards the end and shortly after the end of World War II - in their "Cairo Declaration" (November 27, 1943) and the Potsdam Declaration (July 26, 1945) - the Allies had already called for Tokyo to return all occupied territories to China. The People's Republic of China and Taiwan are invoking these declarations today. The dispute over these islands is not only important because of the abundance of fish in their waters and because of assumed extensive oil and gas deposits in their vicinity. As SWP writes, these islands are above all "part of the strategically important first chain of islands" off the coast of the People's Republic, which "isolates" the Chinese navy "from the Western Pacific." "Major shipping routes" are also leading "through the area around the islands."[4]

Blocking China's Path

According to Shaosheng Tang, Tokyo and Washington attach great importance to denying Beijing control over the Diaoyu Islands: Both would be reluctant to see Chinese influence grow "across the Taiwan Strait into the Pacific."[5] To pursue their geostrategic interests, Japan and the USA are accepting the eventuality of provoking serious frictions with Taiwan, which otherwise serves as their important outpost against the People's Republic. Taiwan also does not recognize Japanese claims to the Diaoyu Islands. Washington and Tokyo are exerting pressure on Taiwan to prevent a partial rapprochement with Beijing over the island dispute. After all, as Tang explained, "lasting confrontations between Taiwan" and the People's Republic would "better serve" Western "interests." To lure Taiwan, Japan also signed a fishing accord with Taipei in Mai, significantly extending Taiwan's fishing grounds and therefore strengthening its general political claims in the international system.

Confrontation and Cooperation

German government advisors are also calling for the enhancement of NATO's cooperation with Japan in view of the dispute over the Diaoyu Islands. Germany has in fact been supporting the arms build-up and training of Japanese Armed Forces since some time. (german-foreign-policy.com reported.[6]) NATO should in any case participate "in the USA's political and military reorientation toward Asia, over the next few decades," according to a recent SWP analysis. In this process, the "active cooperation" with Japan "is essential." The "focus will not be shifted without the participation of other countries in the region": The process could fail, "if countries such as Australia and Singapore would not participate in the new partnership offered by the USA." The SWP is calling for enhancing particularly the political cooperation - and, simultaneously, also include China in this new orientation toward Asia. The think tank is not only advocating a "counterweight to China's growing military capacities" but also "integrative (...) measures" in East Asia. "The stabilization of the East Asian Pacific region requires not only a new Sino-Japanese dialog in the near future, but also effective mechanisms of crisis reduction."[7]

Independent Geostrategic Policy

In another paper published in September, SWP explained how Germany can use this approach to win influence. Because "the EU or individual European countries (...), are not directly involved in the dispute over the islands," they could serve as "mediators," proposes the think tank. They should first establish themselves as "serious discussion partners, within the framework of informal talks," followed by "an official engagement of the EU or of individual European governments." It is urgent to "explore mechanisms of conflict prevention," which can later be followed by efforts to "internationalize the issue of territorial claims." If successful, the EU would not only have "effectively contributed to stabilizing East Asia," it would also have established itself "as a serious mediator in questions of regional security" and win the reputation of being "an independent actor" - "between the USA and China."[8] Berlin and Brussels could thereby pursue their own geostrategic policy in East and Southeast Asia - a long standing goal of Berlin's foreign policy. (german-foreign-policy.com reported [9]).

[1] Michael Paul: Die Nato im Fernen Osten, SWP-Aktuell 59, Oktober 2013
[2] Joint Political Declaration between Japan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation; www.nato.int
[3] Shaosheng Tang: Der Streit um die Diaoyutai-/Senkaku-Inseln, in: Politische Studien Nr. 451, September/Oktober 2013
[4] Nadine Godehardt, Alexandra Sakaki, Gudrun Wacker: Sino-japanischer Inselstreit und europäische Beiträge zur Deeskalation, in: Volker Perthes, Barbara Lippert (Hg.): Ungeplant bleibt der Normalfall. Acht Situationen, die politische Aufmerksamkeit verdienen, SWP-Studie 16, September 2013
[5] Shaosheng Tang: Der Streit um die Diaoyutai-/Senkaku-Inseln, in: Politische Studien Nr. 451, September/Oktober 2013
[6] see also Bündnis mit Tradition
[7] Michael Paul: Die Nato im Fernen Osten, SWP-Aktuell 59, Oktober 2013
[8] Nadine Godehardt, Alexandra Sakaki, Gudrun Wacker: Sino-japanischer Inselstreit und europäische Beiträge zur Deeskalation, in: Volker Perthes, Barbara Lippert (Hg.): Ungeplant bleibt der Normalfall. Acht Situationen, die politische Aufmerksamkeit verdienen, SWP-Studie 16, September 2013
[9] see also The Re-Evaluation of German Foreign Policy