Lessons for Wars to Come
KABUL/BERLIN (Own report) - German foreign policy specialists are evaluating and learning the "lessons" of the war in Afghanistan, for application in future interventions. While the withdrawal of the Bundeswehr is still in full swing and debates of a continued Western military presence in Afghanistan are ongoing, the outgoing security policy speaker of the FDP parliamentary group, Elke Hoff, enumerates glaring mistakes made by NATO and its allies in the implementation of their occupation policy. She explains that various measures were failures because the West had simply not found it necessary to take the needed "time and patience," or because sufficient "knowledge and respect for the cultural specifics of the country" have been considered superfluous - in the context of a war with innumerable casualties and the most devastating disruption of the lives of the people in the war zone. Hoff makes improvement suggestions for future wars, which include obtaining a better understanding of the "organization, the density and structures" of local populations - if possible by conducting a "census." Above all, however, cooperation between the military and aid as well as development organizations should be greatly intensified - even before entering into the next war.
In Retreat
The Bundeswehr's withdrawal from Afghanistan is now in full swing. The first ship carrying 127 military vehicles and other combat material departed from Trabzon, Turkey, and landed in Emden, Germany on August 10. Trabzon serves as the transshipment relay point because maritime transport is much cheaper than airfreight and the reshipping from Trabzon permits the most economical combination. Material, so devalued that repatriation would be too expensive, will be junked at the Hindu Kush or turned over to Afghan troops for their continued use. Up to 1,200 vehicles and 4,800 containers must be shipped back to Germany, according to reports, 90 percent of which will transit through Trabzon. Only weapons, ammunition and specialized equipment will be repatriated by airfreight.
Future Military Presence
The long-term perspective of NATO troops at the Hindu Kush is still unknown. The director of the Security Policy Research Group at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Markus Kaim, writes in the latest issue of "Internationale Politik" that though the German government has agreed to provide up to 800 Bundeswehr soldiers for the so-called "Resolute Support" mission - to train, advise and assist the Afghan security forces that will follow on the heels of ISAF - it remains unclear how large the US contingent will be. Berlin is expecting a total "mission contingent" of between 8,000 and 12,000 soldiers, of which 5,000 are supposed to be from the USA - in addition to another 5,000 US soldiers under direct US command. However, Kaim believes that the decision has not yet been made in the United States, and even an Iraq-type procedure is not out of the question: Washington withdrew its troops entirely, when the Iraqi government absolutely refused to grant US units special rights. Hamid Karzai's Afghan government is attempting to do the same.[1]
No Time, No Patience
As the withdrawal of the Bundeswehr troops and the debate around the future Western military presence in Afghanistan continues, German foreign policy specialists are evaluating the results of the war - also in light of future military interventions. For example, in another article in the latest issue of "Internationale Politik," Elke Hoff, the outgoing security policy speaker for the FDP parliamentary group, points to the "lessons" to be learned from the Afghanistan war. Hoff's retrospective on the implementation of occupation policy over the past twelve years, offers insight into Western arbitrary procedures in armed conflicts, costing innumerable lives and having extreme consequences on the living situation of the local population. According to Hoff, the NATO countries made counter-productive "constant changes in strategy" - "from a 'global war on terror,' then to 'nation building' and on to the Afghans assuming their own 'responsibility for security'." In this framework "Counterinsurgency" (COIN) became "extremely popular." However, the fact that COIN requires "more than anything else, a civilian implementation strategy" was "deliberately overlooked." This, on the other hand would have called for "much (too much) time and patience" that apparently were not intended to be given, as well as "knowledge and respect for the cultural specifics of the country," which were considered superfluous.[2]
A Miscalculation
There is, however, a basic assumption, which has been proven a glaring "miscalculation" [3] - that "assumption is that a government could be installed in Kabul, which would be devoted to the allied countries, while at the same time winning the respect and support of the Afghan population." This same "assumption" has, in the meantime been applied and disproven over and over again: in Iraq, in Libya, at the moment - even though, up to now, only with indirect military intervention [4] - also in Syria. Yet, correcting this assumption is nowhere to be seen on the horizon of German policy-making.
Census in the Occupation Zone
Hoff draws "lessons" from the Afghanistan war, to be used in possible future interventions. It must be clear that it is "immensely more difficult" to build a state, "than it is to overthrow a government," she writes. The former requires an absolutely "greater investment of time, money and political creativity." Frequent changes of strategy must be avoided, instead, the neighboring states should be brought onboard early in the conflict and "civilian reconstruction" must be given higher priority. "Knowledge of the occupied country's civilian population is essential," Hoff observes. "A basic knowledge of their organization, density and structures," is "of decisive importance." Hoff suggests that the quickest way to obtain this essential knowledge for an intervention is to "consider taking a census" in the occupied territory.[5]
Civilian-Military Cooperation
Already before the next major conflict, Hoff seeks to take the consequences of one of the learned "lessons," i.e. the insight that within the framework of a COIN strategy "the armed forces and the civilian organizations (...) are imperatively dependent on one another." This refers to the cooperation between the military and aid as well as development organizations. "Without mutual understanding and common spheres of engagements, civilian and military organizations will waste important resources," declared Hoff. This is why the necessary "cooperation - even independently of current conflicts - must be strategically defined and exercised." "NATO must pay closer attention to this aspect in the future."[6] For Germany, this means that the Bundeswehr must intensify its cooperation with non-governmental organizations operating abroad - even before the next military intervention begins. german-foreign-policy.com will report more next week.
[1] Markus Kaim: Nachfolgemission impossible? Derzeit ist unklar, ob westliche Truppen nach 2014 in Afghanistan bleiben, Internationale Politik Nr. 5, September/Oktober 2013
[2], [3] Elke Hoff: Lektionen aus dem langen Krieg. Was hätten wir in Afghanistan besser machen können? Internationale Politik Nr. 5, September/Oktober 2013
[4] see also German War Assistance and Democratic Interventionism
[5], [6] Elke Hoff: Lektionen aus dem langen Krieg. Was hätten wir in Afghanistan besser machen können? Internationale Politik Nr. 5, September/Oktober 2013
