Facing a Power Vacuum (II)

Predestined for Insurgency

Nils Wörmer, a doctoral fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), who, for several years, had been an officer in commanding positions in the Bundeswehr, published his analysis focused on the development in Kunduz during the years preceding the war in Afghanistan. Wörmer describes the geostrategic particularities and the highly complex factional conflicts in the region of northern Afghanistan, which had already led to violent clashes in the 1980s and particularly in the 1990s. Factional conflicts, basically, still exist today, Wörmer writes and points out that Kunduz was a Taliban stronghold in the late 1990s. In November 2001, the Taliban was fighting its last defensive battles in Kunduz. It was the commanders from that period, who had initiated the insurgency against NATO forces in 2008. Because of it being geographically situated along the routes leading from Afghanistan to Central Asia, opium smuggling is a highly profitable business and it is not difficult to cross the border into the country with equipment needed for the guerilla warfare. Wörmer's analysis implies that Kunduz was somewhat predestined for an insurgency against the German occupation forces.[1]

Without Analysis

Wörmer notes that when Berlin's political decision makers opted in 2003 for Kunduz for the Bundeswehr's deployment, they were neither aware of the region's particular strategic position nor of its highly complex factional conflicts. Both problems, the retired officer considers, could have been recognized at that time - had a sober analysis been made. But rather than undertake a serious investigation, the Bundestag voted in 2003 to deploy German troops - based on the assumption that Kunduz is a fairly stable region. In the absence of an adequate analysis, German forces relied on a faction of the local personnel, who had no power base in their region. Latent - often ethnic - tensions were largely ignored. Today, ISAF finds itself "in the midst of a highly complex insurgency." But the analysis of the situation on the ground is still inadequate,[2] a deficiency that - beyond the practical consequences - points to the ignorance of Germany's quest for hegemony.

Warlords and Militias

SWP government advisors have now begun to even criticize a main pillar of the West's occupation policy - cooperation with local and regional warlords. A recent SWP study explains that the occupation troops have relied "from the very beginning, on local commanders to help secure their own presence and to achieve short-term stability." But, these forces were "for the most part, totally independent of the Afghan government."[3] Private security companies had been called in to do numerous chores. Inasmuch as these were not from the West, they were often "nothing other than the militias of the local ruler." Also the local "self-defense forces," such as the western sponsored and equipped "Afghan local police" (ALP), usually were simply the well-known "local militia." However, because the reinforcement of militias impedes the establishment of a central government repressive apparatus, "Afghanistan's state monopoly on the legitimate use of force is put in jeopardy." This should be alarming, in view of Afghanistan's historical experience of the past few decades. In the 1980s and 90s the warlords, many of whom had been armed by the West against the Soviet Union, plunged that country into a civil war, that it appears to be slipping back into. For years, observers have been criticizing that the West's renewed support for local militias is reinforcing this process. (german-foreign-policy.com reported.[4])

Local Forces

In Berlin, politicians are indicating that they are not ruling out that Afghanistan could slip into an escalation of violence. They are saying that the Afghan "local forces" - indigenous Afghans, who performed services for the Bundeswehr - must be cared for, as soon as the West has withdrawn the majority of its troops from that country. This process is running at full steam. According to reports, western troops have already vacated a third of its bases. Now, in Berlin, they are saying that the "local forces" are endangered following the Bundeswehr's withdrawal - "because they had helped the Germans," explains a Green Party defense policy parliamentarian.[5] It is absolutely essential to bring "these few Bundeswehr auxiliaries" and their relatives to Germany. According to a list drawn up by the defense ministry, this would involve more than 1,500 Afghans, most of them translators, but also editors and service personnel. It is said that many are living in fear. A translator has already applied for asylum in Germany. On the other hand, the interior ministry reiterates that residence permits for Germany will be accorded only on a case-by-case basis.

Promoted

In the meantime, the German Ministry of Defense has announced that Colonel Georg Klein will soon be promoted to the rank of Brigadier General. In early September 2009, Klein had ordered the bombing of two tanker trucks in the vicinity of Kunduz, even though a crowd had gathered around them. 142 civilians were killed in the attack, including children. Klein's promotion is "a slap in the face for the Afghan civilian population,"[6] declared the lawyer representing the victims. Closing the investigation procedure against the colonel had already caused outrage.[7] The Germans' treatment of the Kunduz massacre is being closely monitored in Afghanistan. It is said that the Bundeswehr is paying US $5,000 compensation to each family, who lost a relative in the bombing of the tank trucks.[8] This is an "apparently charitable gesture," but in fact, "only the latest twist in this strange dissention, over how much the life of a dead civilian is worth."

Other reports and background on the War on Afghanistan see here: Killer Teams, Total Loss, The Habitus of Superiority, The Most Reactionary Elements, Post-Treatment Elements, Permanent War, Escalation not Ruled Out and Facing a Power Vacuum.

[1], [2] Nils Wörmer: The Networks of Kunduz. A History of Conflict and Their Actors, from 1992 to 2001, Afghanistan Analysts Network, AAN Thematic Report 02/2012
[3] Marco Overhaus, Michael Paul: Der Aufbau der nationalen afghanischen Sicherheitskräfte. Stand und Perspektiven der Transition nach dem Nato-Gipfel in Chicago, SWP-Studie S17, August 2012
[4] see also Warlords, Die Kolonialisten kommen zurück, Klassische Warlords and Kriegsstrategien (I)
[5] Muss die Bundeswehr afghanische Helfer nach Deutschland mitnehmen? www.bild.de 12.08.2012
[6] Afghanen kritisieren Klein-Beförderung; www.welt.de 09.08.2012
[7] see also Die Bomben von Kunduz, Ungesühnt and Im Sinne der Soldaten
[8] Deadly air strike colonel to be promoted; www.rawa.org 11.08.2012