On a Collision Course (II)

BERLIN/PARIS (Own report) - A sharp dispute over the EU's foreign and security policy between Berlin and Paris is flanking an escalating German-French controversy over the solution to the Euro crisis. As was confirmed by a recent analysis, these German-French power struggles are blocking the EU's hegemonic expansion to the rest of the world, particularly the practical military cooperation or even joint arms projects. The German-French brigade, which had once been considered a prominent example of a future European military contingent, is seen now as "an experiment that has reached its borders." Analysts point to the fact that a pragmatic military cooperation between France and Great Britain has led to a measurable success - most recently by bombing a new regime into power in Libya, - whereas, at the same time, the German-French "blockade" thwarts a unified EU policy. Experts diagnose the EU's military polices as already being "in a coma" and predict Europe's subordination to the USA.

German-French Agenda

An analysis by the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) explains that in retrospect, after the German change of government in September 2009, many were hoping for a "revival of German-French cooperation" - also in the fields of foreign and security policy. The EU's hegemonic outreach, in particular, has been stifled - obviously because of dissention between its two strongest powers. The conservative-liberal coalition was supposed to correct the situation. In fact Berlin and Paris have agreed on a "German-French Agenda 2020," including an array of proposals also for foreign and security policy, which had been presented to the German-French Ministerial Council in February 2010. "One year after the Agenda was published, the governments are still having enormous difficulties in better coordinating their activities in the named sectors," summarized the DGAP diplomatically encoded. A realization of the announced joint measures has not materialized. The EU's global power policy is stagnating accordingly. German-French agreements (December 2010), which also involve Poland, have also failed to advance.[1]

Dissuasive Examples

The DGAP's analysis is first of all concentrated on the German-French "blockades" in military policy. These "blockades" concern the German-French Brigade, for example, which was "created as a symbol of German-French cooperation" in 1989. Even though the brigade, on various occasions, has been sent on missions, particularly to Southeast Europe - a region of German interests - the cooperation does not extend beyond that point, "the experiment has reached its borders."[2] The question of armament does not look differently. Though there is a tradition of successful German-French arms cooperation - between 1958 - 1998 nearly half of all bilateral French cooperation projects were transacted with German companies, only a quarter with British companies. In the meantime, German-French projects are "seen as dissuasive examples." There have been constant "price increases," "delays," a "politicization of industrial questions." In fact, the cooperation between Berlin and Paris, for example with EADS, or also in the conceptualization of a possible European naval cooperation ("EADS of the Seas"), have for years been characterized by sharp rivalry - as a result of a power struggle, in which the German side has advantages, but cannot totally vanquish its French rival. (german-foreign-policy.com reported.[3])

Pragmatic

The German-French "blockades" are that much more serious, given the fact that France and Great Britain successfully initiated a military cooperation project last year, with an accord dated December 2010. According to the DGAP, the significance of this French-British cooperation lies in the fact that these two countries together account for "more than 50 percent of Europe's composite defense expenditures and two-thirds of Europe's expenditures on military research and development."[4] Paris and London are including ambitious arms projects in their cooperation, among them projects for the production of rockets and drones. This cooperation, explains the analysis, is definitely oriented on "pragmatism" - and benefits from the fact that Great Britain and France are Europe's only nuclear powers. Nuclear projects are among their joint ventures. The French-British cooperation is shaping up much more dynamically than the stagnating German-French programs. The war on Libya can serve as an example. Whereas the EU's last two major military missions in Africa - in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in 2006 and the intervention in Chad 2008/2009 - were characterized by German-French bickering and therefore, remain without major impact, Paris and London, over the past few months, have bombed a new government into power in Tripoli.

Successfully Sabotaged

In fact, the new French-British cooperation, by which Germany - as in the case of the war on Libya - tends to see itself marginalized, is in reaction to the years of German predominance in EU foreign and military policy making. Above all, Berlin has systematically sabotaged French projects. After the sweeping interventions of the 1990s and 2000s in southeastern Europe - principally in German interests and spheres of influence - Paris' plans to have the EU expand more forcefully into France's sphere of influence - into Africa - was thwarted by Germany. Though there were two military interventions into the Congo (2003 and 2006) - also to test the intervention capability of the European armed forces, they remained isolated - and a third intervention, the French inspired Chad intervention 2008/2009, was a complete disaster.[5] The Mediterranean Union, with which Paris sought to stabilize its sphere of influence in North Africa, was prevented by Germany's years of systematic obstructionist policies.[6] For Berlin, the only interventions worthy of future consideration, are those in countries of the non Francophone areas of Africa - in the German-US American spheres of influence, above all in Sudan. With the war on Libya, Paris successfully broke Germany's predominance for the first time. Of course, France's influence was not strong enough to rally the rest of the EU.[7]

US Guarantees

Whereas similar German-French power struggles characterize the current efforts to find a solution to the Euro crisis, (german-foreign-policy.com reported [8]) experts are expressing a growing skepticism as to whether the EU will be able to engage in a unified hegemonic global expansion, in the foreseeable future. For example, the DGAP points out that "in political circles in Germany" the demand for a common EU army is becoming stronger, even though these EU battle groups, which have been established since some time, are not even being used - "because of dissention among the member states concerning objective and conditions of their deployment."[9] Just recently, a former member of the DGAP demanded that the efforts to create a common military policy be abandoned. The "common security and defense policy" (CSDP) is laying "in a deep coma, in spite of a handful of missions and a lot of symbolism - a coma, from which it will most probably never recover," wrote the expert, in view of the "blockades" caused by German-French rivalry. But it is "not as disastrous, as it might sound, because there is an alternative for the Europeans: the transatlantic relations." "In the end, the Americans will guarantee Europe's security, regardless of how difficult it will be for the proud Europeans to accept."[10] Until now, Germany had been ambitiously promoting the common foreign and security policy, to avoid exactly this perspective and achieve a separate role as a world power.

[1], [2] Louis-Marie Clouet, Andreas Marchetti: Ungewisse Zukunft der Gemeinsamen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik. Notwendige deutsch-französische Reflexionen, DGAPanalyse Frankreich No. 6, September 2011
[3] see also More Influence Than Ever, Kernfähigkeit Rüstung and Größeres Selbstbewusstsein
[4] Louis-Marie Clouet, Andreas Marchetti: Ungewisse Zukunft der Gemeinsamen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik. Notwendige deutsch-französische Reflexionen, DGAPanalyse Frankreich No. 6, September 2011
[5] see also Transatlantic Front and In the Advantage
[6] see also In the Shadows and Kein Gegenpol
[7] see also First Time going it Alone
[8] see also Auf Kollisionskurs
[9] Louis-Marie Clouet, Andreas Marchetti: Ungewisse Zukunft der Gemeinsamen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik. Notwendige deutsch-französische Reflexionen, DGAPanalyse Frankreich No. 6, September 2011
[10] Jan Techau: Forget CSDP, it's time for Plan B; ecfr.eu 26.08.2011


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