The Libyan Strategy

Resounding Effect

According to an analysis published by the CDU-affiliated Konrad Adenauer Foundation, NATO's wars against Yugoslavia, in the 90s, had doubtlessly been a western success. At the time, the military alliance only engaged their air force, but no ground troops, against Serbia. The US government's decision, under Bill Clinton, to "let the Croat military be trained, for its war against Serb troops, by an American military advisory company had been decisive." The company's employees had been recruited from among "former high-ranking military personnel." In addition, Washington, in effect, nullified the UN arms embargo against the Croat and Bosnian Muslim troops. "American warships permitted the passage of arms deliveries."[1] The thus supported Croat and Muslim militias could soon launch "a counter-offensive," according to this analysis, in which "grave war crimes were committed, which are being prosecuted today by the UN Tribunal in The Hague", but the operation was "so effective" that Serbia was soon forced to concede. The "indirect form of western combat," at the time, had a "resounding effect."

Avoid Mistakes

The analysis explains further that Washington had made a mistake, when it decided to deploy its own ground forces in Afghanistan in 2001 and in Iraq in 2003, a mistake "with fatal consequences." In those conflicts, thousands of western soldiers have been killed and tens of thousands wounded. "These interventions are an economic disaster as well," writes the author. According to calculations by the US economist, Joseph Stiglitz, the third Gulf War, alone, has devoured between three and five trillion US dollars, "money that is sorely needed for public investments in research, education and infrastructure."[2] The outcomes of these two wars are anything but satisfactory, which is why the West is again relying on "its air supremacy" and supporting "the allied local ground troops" - as in Yugoslavia earlier - "with secret agents, special forces, military advisors and arms deliveries via third countries." France, recently using a similar approach in the Ivory Coast, was successful in overthrowing the unfavorable Ivorian president. (german-foreign-policy.com reported.[3]) Great Britain even intervened without difficulties in Sierra Leone with ground troops. The ground troops were withdrawn as soon as possible, and now there are "security guarantees" - the Freetown regime has promised London that, in the case of uprisings, troops could be flown in immediately."[4] "The West has now perpetuated this tradition of British and French interventions in Libya," concluded the author.

Divide and Conquer

Government advisors in Berlin point out that, in the case of Libya, the allies of the West, operating on the ground, the Transitional National Council (TNC) and its militias, must be brought to a tactically clever policy with this newly conquered power, to avoid plunging the country into a long-term civil war. The German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) issued this warning in a new publication. In the future, "members of the former security establishment" could also put up resistance against the new regime.[5] A feasible solution must be found. Simply disbanding the military and police, as the United States did in Iraq, has proven to be completely counterproductive, according to specialist circles. In Iraq, many of the forces of repression, still loyal to the deposed regime, went underground and fueled the civil war. Therefore the Libyan military and police should, under no circumstances, be disbanded.[6] The SWP also points out that the "body of the new security apparatus" comprised of Gadhafi loyal forces could also "develop into the nucleus of a rebellion against the new order." The aim is to create divisions among them - taking "those of the security apparatus in leading positions of responsibility" to court, while simultaneously integrating others "of the regime's client groups" into the "political process," letting them at least partially share power. This is the only way to prevent an Iraq-type civil war situation.

Political Dissention and Power Struggles

The SWP also suggests that the TNC must generally enlarge its political base of support, which means that also those sectors of the population must be integrated "who either had remained neutral in the civil war or had taken sides for the regime."[7] "The inclusion of other sectors of the population following the putsch" would "broaden even further the spectrum of participants," warns the SWP, and this could lead to political dissention and ultimately "to power struggles." This engenders "the danger that these rivalries could also turn violent," especially if forces remain in the military and police, who are not completely loyal. The TNC will have to handle this situation, if necessary with western assistance. However, a long-term deployment of western military forces, according to SWP, is not advisable. "International troops" in Libya, like in Iraq, "would probably be generally unwelcomed."

Disarmament

To reduce the danger of sustained conflicts, the West insists also that Libya be disarmed. According to the EU and the USA, there is a danger that the weapons in the country could fall into the wrong hands. This danger must be countered with the appropriate measures. The United States has now begun to buy back weapons - a measure also used in Afghanistan following the overthrow of the Taliban. German Foreign Minister Westerwelle has also declared his intention of removing lethal weapons from the market to prevent an escalation of violence. The EU has already stationed a functionary in Benghazi, with the task of preparing a security reform - the objective of which is to collect as many weapons in Libya as possible. These initiatives refer to a necessary supplement to the combat, providing combat material to the native ground forces, so as to restrict western activities to providing air support, while at the same time, seeking to prevent their allies from tearing each other to pieces in murderous sectarian conflicts.

Libyan Model

As the author of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation analysis predicts, the war strategy used by the West in Yugoslavia, and now in Libya, could also bear fruit in Afghanistan and Iraq. As a matter of fact, the West had used the "northern alliance" as its ground troops before marching in itself. In Iraq, at the beginning of the 1990s, Shiite militias became the West's henchmen.[8] Because the Libyan Strategy provides the possibility of waging war, while avoiding excessive costs and a vast number of western casualties, as in Afghanistan, it can serve as a model for future western interventions against other countries.

[1], [2] Thomas Speckmann: Die Libyen-Doktrin. Lernen aus den Fehlern in Afghanistan und im Irak, Die politische Meinung Nr. 498, Mai 2011
[3] see The Right of Might (II)
[4] Thomas Speckmann: Die Libyen-Doktrin. Lernen aus den Fehlern in Afghanistan und im Irak, Die politische Meinung Nr. 498, Mai 2011
[5] Wolfram Lacher: Herausforderungen in Libyen nach Qaddafi; www.swp-berlin.org 24.08.2011
[6] The Baghdad Syndrome; www.foreignpolicy.com 26.08.2011
[7] Wolfram Lacher: Herausforderungen in Libyen nach Qaddafi; www.swp-berlin.org 24.08.2011
[8] Thomas Speckmann: Die Libyen-Doktrin. Lernen aus den Fehlern in Afghanistan und im Irak, Die politische Meinung Nr. 498, Mai 2011