Human Intelligence

March on Kabul

It is the unanimous opinion of all observers that the insurgency is consistently growing in Afghanistan. This is not only noticeable in the number of casualties among the Western occupation forces that have been registered. From 2002 - 2004, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) have registered together between 57 and 69 casualties per year. Since then, the number has significantly grown to reach a preliminary high of 232 last year. The combat has long since extended beyond the south and east of the country. According to Brig. Gen. Dieter Warnecke, replaced last January as commander of the ISAF operations in Northern Afghanistan, the insurgents have successfully "been able to again extend their influence from the Pashtun inhabited regions in the south and east (...) to the provinces in the west and since 2007 even into the north."[1] Warnecke described the insurgents' line of action as the "March on Kabul."

Badghis

To a growing extent, the Bundeswehr's area of operations in the north is implicated in the insurgency. Last fall, the German camp in Konduz was regularly under rocket fire that could only be reduced with continuous patrols of the area, significantly elevating the number of German soldiers dispatched to insure their own security. Step by step, the insurgents are approaching the German mandated area from the west. Last summer the first comprehensive Taliban offensive was reported in the Badghis Province, to the west of the Bundeswehr's location in Northern Afghanistan. By the fall, the insurgents had so significantly consolidated their forces, that the ISAF commander at the time, Dieter Warnecke ordered a major offensive. The "Operation Herekate Yolo II" [2] was the first comprehensive ground offensive with German participation since World War II, yet it was unsuccessful. The Taliban were again present in Badghis in the spring of 2008. Warnecke's successor, Brig. Gen. Dieter Dammjacob, responded with another major offensive - "Operation Karez."

Sustained Combat

There is still little known about "Operation Karez" even though it involved heavy combat. What has been reported is that there were mortar and aerial attacks and the use of armored mechanized infantry vehicles. Purely by coincidence, there were no ISAF casualties.[3] The operation bears a certain significance, in that similar operations could again be carried out - but with the participation of the Bundeswehr's freshly arrived "rapid deployment force".[4] Combat persists in Badghis. Because of hefty battles last weekend, NATO again called in aerial combat support. Approx. 50 insurgents were killed.[5] There is no end in sight to combat in the province. The situation in Badghis gives an idea of the type of escalation that hovers on the horizon, if the insurgents do ever get established in Kabul.

Offensive Weapons

In light of this situation, German government advisors are calling for decisive measures. Their plea, to supplement the contingent of troops in Afghanistan, is increasingly finding sympathetic ears in Berlin. According to press reports, a decision, to dispatch more German troops, is expected to be taken in the fall.[6] According to SWP, the Bundeswehr must also be furnished more modern equipment and according to a recently published study, Berlin must rectify the "most glaring deficits".[7] The acquisition of addition unmanned spy drones ("MALE-UAV" or "Medium Altitude Long Endurance - Unmanned Aerial Vehicules") is absolutely essential, according to this study. The troops can renounce on additional helicopters as little as they can renounce on an "optimization of their capacity to prevail." What is meant by "capacity to prevail" is described by the arms producer Rheinmetall, in Duesseldorf. Rheinmetall produces also the SPIKE LR weapons system, recommended by SWP.[8] According to the company's praise of its product, when using the SPIKE LR rocket system (range: 4,000 meters), "the operator can intervene at any point during the engagement process in order to correct the missile's trajectory."[9] Also according to the producers, the "pinpoint impact capability is also useful in taking out bunkers, since the approaching missile can be guided to weak points such as doors or ventilator openings."

Civilian-Military

Alongside such offensive weapons, the SWP is recommending enhanced spying on the country. Particularly "in the domain of 'human intelligence'" it would be "sensible to carry our significant increases in personnel, since one can get valuable information from the population in the areas of operation."[10] Therefore "the enormous potential of the CIMIC forces" (Civilian-Military Cooperation - CIMIC) should in the future "be taken more into consideration." In such a "multifaceted and quickly transforming social environment as Afghanistan" argues the SWP "knowledge about local power relations [is] extremely important." This knowledge is above all available to the alleged civilian CIMIC forces that are in contact with the population. The SWP reports that CIMIC is, in the meantime, even part "of the training courses at the Bundeswehr's Leadership Academy" in Hamburg. "Therefore future commanders can become familiar with the high utility of CIMIC for generating situation reports, evaluations and for drawing up operational recommendations." It is precisely the military exploitation of alleged civilian activities that turns personnel of aid organizations into targets of the insurgents. For years aid organizations have been criticizing the Civilian-Military Cooperation as a misappropriation of their humanitarian work.[11]

Concentrated

The SWP would like to make civilian or alleged civilian resources more available even at the highest command levels. To prevent "frictional loss," the think tank demands that "at the operational level" in the future "the resources of individual ministries [having activities in Afghanistan, (gfp.com note)] should be concentrated within a common organizational unit."[12] For example "the interior ministry personnel, charged with supervising the police mission, should be incorporated into the mission command structure of the defense ministry." This should apply "in general" to personnel of all "civilian ministries engaged in foreign missions."

Embedded

Even for the German ISAF commander, the SWP recommends still another reinforcement, through the commissioning of civilian personnel, at the military command level. He should immediately initiate the "key leader engagement", which the former ISAF commander, Dieter Warnecke describes as the task of "regularly speaking with important Afghan personalities, such as governors, former warlords, tribal chiefs, generals of past wars and ministers in Kabul to build trust and thereby gain influence."[13] The high political significance relegated to the soldiers, rather than civilians, is evident. According to SWP, the standing of the military leadership could be enhanced though a civilian staff. Commanders "at strategic, operative and tactical levels" must be "always accompanied by specialists, such as anthropologists, sociologists and regional specialists." They could "together with military communication officers" provide competent advice "or 'embedded' in the combat units, accompany politically sensitive operations."[14] The SWP does not find this scenario unrealistic: "The US Army is already applying these methods."

Please read also: On the Ruins of War, The Greens' local in Kabul, The Retreat Option, Hopeless, To Accomplish a Mission, Perspective of Withdrawal and Paramilitary.

[1] Dieter Warnecke: Kommandeur in Afghanistan. Erfahrungen eines Truppenführers 2007/2008; if. Zeitschrift für Innere Führung 1/2008
[2] see also Mandatsbruch and Koloniales Modell
[3] Telemark Battalion in new combat with Taliban; Aftenposten 27.05.2008. See also Spezialkommandos
[4] see also Paramilitärs and 250.000
[5] Dozens of rebels killed in Afghan strikes: officials; AFP 02.06.2008
[6] Jung unter Druck; ddp 04.06.2008
[7], [8] Sascha Lange: Die Bundeswehr in Afghanistan. Personal und technische Ausstattung in der Einsatzrealität; SWP-Studie S9, März 2008
[9] EUROSPIKE. A forward-looking multi-functional weapons system that hits hard; www.rheinmetall-ag.com March 2005
[10] Sascha Lange: Die Bundeswehr in Afghanistan. Personal und technische Ausstattung in der Einsatzrealität; SWP-Studie S9, März 2008
[11] see also Deutsche Hilfsorganisationen: "Koalitionen mit dem Militär", Unterstützungsfunktion, Von Helfern zu Kollaborateuren, Leerer Raum and Fünfte Kolonne
[12] Timo Noetzel, Martin Zapfe: Aufstandsbekämpfung als Auftrag. Instrumente und Planungsstrukturen für den ISAF-Einsatz; SWP-Studie S13, Mai 2008
[13] Dieter Warnecke: Kommandeur in Afghanistan. Erfahrungen eines Truppenführers 2007/2008; if. Zeitschrift für Innere Führung 1/2008
[14] Timo Noetzel, Martin Zapfe: Aufstandsbekämpfung als Auftrag. Instrumente und Planungsstrukturen für den ISAF-Einsatz; SWP-Studie S13, Mai 2008