More War

BONN / BRUSSELS A ,,strategy paper"of the German Bertelsmann Foundation lists measures for radically militarizing the European Union. Recommendations include military and paramilitary measures which would enable the EU to perform ,,missions on a greater scale, over a larger radius, with greater fighting strength and extending over a longer period of time". This strategy aims for the internal and external preparation for wars which are to be conducted ,,preventatively"( ,,robust preventive missions, possibly anywhere in the world").

Substantial additions of military personnel and increases of armaments spending by all EU members are necessary for the intended world wide military operations. A supranational EU emergency body ( ,,EU Defense Council"), evading controls by all parliaments, would preside over the planned wars and direct military as well as civilian-military measures in all EU member states. War preparations and conduct of wars are to be led by a triumvirate ( ,,trirektoire") of German, French and British military who would completely control the troops and arsenals of the other member states.

Excerpts from the document:

Bertelsmann Foundation

A European Defence Strategy

Written by Julian Lindley-French and Franco Algieri
Advised by Thomas Bauer, Yves Boyer, Janis Emmanouilidis, Tuomas Forsberg, Stefani Weiss, and Rob de Wijk
Gütersloh 2004

The Strategy

The Venusberg Strategy 2004 calls upon EU member-states to rapidly harden the European Security Strategy into a European strategic concept. A European Strategic Concept would represent a new departure in transnational security thinking and organisation, because it would meld into a single conceptual framework national, civil and military, as well as offensive and defensive security and defence efforts. (...)

Executive Summary and Policy Recommendations

(...) The security and defence missions implied in the European Security Strategy (ESS) call for the development of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) that carries out a far broader range of missions than currently envisaged, over far greater distance, at potentially higher levels of conflict intensity and for longer periods. (...)

The European Security Strategy is a pre-strategic concept. In light of the new threats the ESS must be rapidly consolidated into a European strategic concept that will formalise when, why, where and how the EU will act. (...)

Military missionsimplied by the ESS suggest the need for European armed forces to operate progressively higher up the conflict intensity scale from defence diplomacy at one end through to robust preventive missions, possibly anywhere in the world. (...)

An EU Security Council(EUSC) should be established incorporating the Political and Security Committee (PSC). The EUSC will balance security effectiveness with political legitimacy. The EUSC would be responsible for both military and civilian security and in time the defence of the Union. The EUSC will be co-chaired permanently by EU Foreign and Security Ministers. During a crisis, the Council will retain overall strategic direction, with control of EU operations under the EUSC. Military operational leadership will be the responsibility of a trirectoire of Britain, France and Germany prior to the establishment of an EU Permanent, Combined and Joint Headquarters (EUPCJHQ). (...)

Building on the 2004 decision to create an EU Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator, an EU Homeland Security Agency(EUHSA) under the direct control of the EUSC and headed by a new EU Security Minister will be essential to guarantee the protection of the European security space and to overcome national and bureaucratic constraints on security performance. The EUHSA will be empowered to co-ordinate the homeland security activities of all member-states, act as an ideas generator and information brokerage. Embedded within the EU Homeland Security Agency should be an EU Counter-Terrorism Intelligence Agency (EUCTIA). The developing civil/military structures within the EU Military Staff should provide the basis for the development of such an Agency. (...)

The missions implicit in the ESS and the enhanced Petersberg Tasks will require the progressive broadening of the military task listof EU armed forces over the next ten years. (...)

What Europe Can and Cannot Do Now

There are 1.7 million Europeans in uniform, but only 170,000 combat soldiers, of which only 40-50,000 can be used for robust combat operations at any one time. Equally, it is very difficult to envisage an ESS-type scenario that could not be managed by 170,000 well-equipped and welltrained European troops. A strategic ESDP should have therefore two force planning objectives. First, to increase the number of well-equipped, trained and properly supported forces to around 170,000. Second, to improve the usability of the other forces to better enable them to undertake lower-intensity, follow-on missions, such as peacekeeping. Such a force level and force structure would enable the military fulfilment of ESS-type missions. (...)

How to Close the Gap Between the European Security Strategy and the ESDP

Strategic ESDP missions will be organised through coalitions of the willing and able. The EU itself should progressively assume the responsibilities of a coalition leader. (...)
The need for rapid and marked improvement in European military effectiveness emphasises the need for a distinct European Force Transformation Conceptthat merges some American-style concepts for electronically 'joined up' forces with European experience of 'muddy boots' peacemaking and peacekeeping. (...)

As EU forces find themselves deployed on ever higher intensity missions, planning and command of flexible coalitions will need to be formalised. The robust development of EU planning and command cells at both SHAPE and the EU Military Staff (EUMS) into NATO-compatible headquarters will ensure autonomous EU control over medium to high-intensity operations. (...)

European strategic self-confidence will only be realised when Europe has sufficient strategic eyes and ears. Europeans will only act promptly and in a determined manner when they are sure that they control both the quality and flow of strategic intelligence. Some duplication with US and NATO assets and capabilities is both essential and unavoidable. (...)

In the interim between EU coalition management and defence integration the military leadership by the major Europeans will be essential. Smaller states must become specialised and organised around an autonomous EU planning and command capability. (...)

In addition to limited strategic intelligence satellites and other air-breathing systems (such as global reach unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)), advanced communications and effective ground surveillance (C4ISR), EU forces need effective suppression of enemy air defences (SEAD), offensive electronic warfare (OEW) capabilities, fast strategic lift (air and sea), force protection capabilities, and precision-guided munitions (PGMs). (...)

Combat troops do not make good police officers. Gendarmerie, Guardia Civil and Carabinieri-type forces that can bridge the gap between combat soldiering and policing will be essential for the reconstruction of societies in the immediate post-conflict phase and the re-establishment of norms of civil society. The French proposal to establish a European GendarmerieForce is therefore to be welcomed and strengthened. The EU needs a force of at least 10,000 'European Gendarmes' directly answerable to it. (...)

The EU must also develop a cadre of specialists in the reconstruction of infrastructure, such as sewage systems, electrical and water supply, health services, as well as better co-ordinated policy and implementation with non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Such a capability will be vital if having won a war Europe is not to lose the peace. It must be integrated into overall EU civil-military crisis management planning and co-ordinated through the EU crisis management system. (...)

How to Support a Strategic ESDP

(...) Europe's developing high-speed rail networkmust be better employed to move EU forces rapidly in support of EU operations, either adjacent to a theatre (such as the Adriatic coast of Italy) or to a port (UK forces from southern England to Marseilles, for example).
- The EU must also explore the feasibility of legally requisitioning shipsof member-states for service during a time of crisis by adapting European law to enable the use of ships under flag to EU member-states.
- An EU Joint Intelligence Committee (EJIC)working directly into the office of the EU Security Minister will help to co-ordinate and safeguard shared intelligence, staffed by national intelligence officers who will process and evaluate raw intelligence, supported by national intelligence agencies. (...)

How to Equip a Strategic ESDP

(...) The European common defence market, supported by a common Research & Technology budget and co-ordinated through a strong European Defence Agency (EDA) would undoubtedly improve cost-effectiveness for European armed forces undergoing transformation.
- The need for a single European defence market is self-evident. If the US follows a 'Buy American First' strategy, the EU must adopt a ,,Buy European First strategy''to safeguard procurement for European armed forces. Securing Europe's autonomous supply of advanced military technology and equipment (and its re-supply) is a pre-requisite for a strategic ESDP. However, it may be cheaper on occasions to buy American, particularly if they alone have the technology required. (...)

If the trirectoire will lead EU military coalitions on the behalf of the EU, BAe Systems, EADS and Thales should evolve into a European defence-industrial trirectoire as prime contractors that can lead procurement projects under the aegis of the EDA. (...)

How to Afford a Strategic ESDP

For the EU to develop forces able to fulfil ESS-type missions will require that all EU memberstates spend a minimum of 2% GDP per annum on defence. At least 10% of respective national defence budgets must be earmarked for transformation projects. (...)

2.2. The Three Tiers of Capability

Britain, France and Germany
At the same time there are three tiers of national armed forces within the EU that have important implications for the organisation of ESS-type missions. In some respects force structuring and packaging should be relatively straightforward because there is a natural division between the bigger states with significant capabilities, smaller EU member-states with some limited medium and even high-intensity capabilities and the rest, the forces of which are better suited to lower-to-medium intensity missions. Only Britain and France possess strategic headquarters staffed by experienced officers that could plan and command operations across the enhanced Petersberg Tasks. Britain and France can also furnish the EU with significant forces for forced entry, high-end stabilisation and peacemaking operations. Moreover, because some ESS-type missions imply at their high end intense, short duration conflicts using highly specialised forces are at a premium. To that end Britain, France and Germany have recently proposed Battle Groups to enhance Europe's initial response to such contingencies.

Netherlands, Italy, Spain and Poland
The Dutch, Italians, Spanish and Poles represent the second tier of conflict spectrum capabilities, capable of projecting some elements and providing lower numbers of stabilisation and peacekeeping forces. It should be noted that the Italians have had some 10,000 troops stationed abroad for the past ten years, albeit on mainly peacekeeping missions. Second-tier countries could deploy field headquarters and some component commands for coalitions. However, only the major powers are able to provide high-level commands or forces across the European mission spectrum. Equally, Spain and Italy (in addition to France) could play a vital role by providing special police forces, such as Guardia Civil and Carabinieri essential to the successful management of transition between the tasks of combat troops in peacemaking, peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction and civil policing.

The wider EU
The third tier of forces (or niche forces) would be provided by other EU member-states. Specialisation would be the key, with each country progressively concentrating on areas of relative expertise. The newer member-states, grappling as they are with economic and defence reform, could add significantly to the overall effort by providing through aggregation a pool of forces specifically trained for lower-to-medium intensity operations, such as robust peacekeeping. Over time the high intensity/low intensity balance would change as defence investment patterns of the smaller member-states improve. However, such a division of labour would ensure that the enhanced Petersberg Tasks can not only be met but that a degree of operational redundancy is built into them. Whilst the nature of ESS-type missions implies some degree of military hierarchy between member-states, specialisation does not imply a political hierarchy within EU operations, but rather that every member state contributes in ist own way and at its own level to successful EU operations. The EUSC will ensure equitable political leadership. (...)

3. With Whom a Strategic ESDP Should Work

(...) In many ways, the European Security Strategy was a response to the US National Security Strategy of 2002 offering both support to America's aims and yet implicitly questioning the American security method. That said, the United States will remain the EU's main strategic partner with NATO remaining the guardian of the military link with American forces. (...)

Other Strategic Partners

Amongst the other major powers that are either affected or to a certain degree involved in a strategic ESDP, Russia is vital. At the very least it is clear that Russia must be convinced of the value of a strategic ESDP and encouraged to deepen its relationship with the EU. The development of a strategic ESDP also represents a new structure within the broad European security architecture that must be compatible with and acceptable to new partners. The Cold War is over and the ESS implies new partnerships, not only with Russia but others, such as Canada, China, India, Japan and Ukraine. Moreover, strong regional partnerships will be essential. Indeed, a strategic ESDP will have significant influence in regions as widely separated as the Americas, Asia, the Middle East and Africa. A strategic ESDP will also require a direct EU diplomatic presence around the world under the control of the EU Foreign Minister. (...)

7. Agenda for the Future (...) The Role of Anglo-French Nuclear Forces

Although Anglo-French nuclear forces have no formal ESDP role they afford a de facto extended deterrence to all EU and NATO partners, even though neither London nor Paris would be willing to admit as much. In time it may be that the role of these forces might have to be formalised within an EU framework as they are within the NATO framework. Again, given the current strategic environment it will clearly not be for some time yet, but it is an issue that is unlikely to be avoided indefinitely. (...)

The Venusberg Group Reports

The Venusberg Group is a high-level network of security and defence experts from across Europe brought together by the Bertelsmann Foundation in Guetersloh and the Bertelsmann Group for Policy Research at the Center for Applied Policy Research (CAP), University of Munich, to examine the future of EU security policy. The Group was formed in early 1999 following a meeting that took place at a hotel on the Venusberg near Bonn, close to the Petersberg where in 1992 European leaders established the basis for EU defence. (...)
The members of the 2004 core group are Franco Algieri, Thomas Bauer and Janis Emmanouilidis, all Center for Applied Policy Research, Munich; Yves Boyer, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, Paris; Tuomas Forsberg, George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen; Julian Lindley-French, Geneva Centre for Security Studies, Geneva; Stefani Weiss, Bertelsmann Foundation, Guetersloh; Rob de Wijk, Clingendael Centre for Strategic Studies, The Hague.

Quelle:
Bertelsmann Foundation: A European Defence Strategy; www.cap.uni-muenchen.de


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