Less Predictable
In numerous East and Southeast European countries, "populist parties have gained ground in the elections" writes the German Institute for Political and Foreign Affairs (SWP) in a recently published study.[1] In some cases the "populists" were able to even come to power in their respective countries. Their foreign policy is "less predictable" - they threaten to establish close ties to EU rivals, for example the USA or Russia. Therefore "strategies of action for dealing with the phenomenon of populism" must be developed. The SWP has now dedicated a comprehensive analysis, discussing the causes, characteristics and peculiarities of this "phenomenon," while proposing various options for combating it.
Loser Milieus
According to the SWP, the followers of these East and Southeast European "populist" parties can be precisely localized, as mainly inhabitants, in these formerly socialist countries, of "weakly structured and peasant influenced" regions, where the pauperization of entire regions, since 1989/90, has robbed them of every perspective.[2] The "urban loser milieus" also tend to join the "populists". They are not only comprised of the unemployed, impoverished workers, but also the deteriorating petty bourgeoisie, "left behind by the aspiring, new, mostly urban middle class." Whereas the latter are working for large West European or US corporations - with good perspectives - or are in the arts, the sciences and government institutions with close contacts to West European centers, the situation is often catastrophic for simple teachers or doctors and retailers are being run out of business by western supermarket chains. "The transformation's open social flank," writes SWP, is inducing "strong disenchantment" in growing circles of the population. The EU loyal East and Southeast European elites are often not up to handling this alienation.
Anti-Establishment Protest
In fact, parties are being formed by those from the "peripheries and urban loser milieus" (SWP), who are consolidating the bitterness over the dramatic impoverishment and social decline. The often encountered "anti-establishment protest" is a typical attribute of "populist" politics, writes the SWP, affirming an "anti-elitist attitude" among the "populists." "Populism draws the line between itself and those above it." They often use a "confrontational, exclusive and antagonizing rhetoric" for their "success in mobilizing" - according to SWP, another characteristic of "populist" politics. And if the "anti-establishment protest" is also explained in simple terms ("simplified") and represented mainly by a single prominent personality ("personalized"), then, according to SWP, it meets all of the characteristics of "populism." The SWP not only applies the term "populism" indiscriminately to right-wingers, left-wingers, conservatives and liberals, who refuse to buckle under to the national elites loyal to the EU, but surprisingly also to rightwing extremists, racists and anti-Semites.
Integration or Isolation
SWP is searching for ways to combat „populism", because it poses a threat to the EU loyal elite's predominance in East and Southeast Europe. The government advisors can draw on experiences Berlin has made with the Kaczyński brothers' Prawo i Sprawiedliwość Party (PiS), in Poland or with the SMER Party in Slovakia. The SWP considers both parties to be typically "populist". According to opinion polls, PiS could receive one third of the Polish votes in the European elections and SMER could become the strongest party in Slovakia.[3] The "anti-populist" strategy has to be adjusted to each individual case of "populism", judges SWP. If a party is only "populist infiltrated" it could suffice to actively pursue its integration. This method was successful with the Bulgarian "tsarist party" NDSV: integration turned it into a "more or less blurred liberal force". It is possible to cooperate with moderate "populist" governments, but relations should not "only be pursued in a hushed manner". "Hard core populists" should be isolated to weaken them in the intermediate term.
New Elite Reserves
In the long run, EU loyal forces in East and Southeast Europe should be reinforced, writes SWP. It may be necessary to remove the "obsolete elites from the period of transition" and "replace them with new leadership personnel". "This is why," according to the SWP, "new elite reserves for moderate party policies must be developed". The personnel required could be recruited "particularly from local and regional autonomous administrations that have tremendously grown in importance subsequent to measures of decentralization over the last few years." The East and Southeast European parties loyal to the EU must be stabilized with the aid of West European dominated pan-EU party structures. The "locally engaged party-affiliated or ideologically oriented Western European NGOs" - obviously referring to German party affiliated foundations - will also play an important role.
Long Wind
Obviously SWP does not expect that an EU loyal infiltration of the East and Southeast European elite can quickly and permanently weaken the "populists": The EU will have to deal with "the challenge of populism" for an extended period. The Eastern periphery’s total adjustment to becoming the docile backyard of the German hub cannot be achieved at short notice. It requires patience and lots of time.
