Beantwortung einer Kleinen Anfrage der PDS-Fraktion im sächsischen Landtag
Sächsisches Staatsministerium des Innern
Der Staatsminister
Dresden, den 16.06.2005
Aktenzeichen: 37-0141.50/1794
An den Präsidenten des Sächsischen Landtages
Herrn Erich Iltgen, MdL
- im Posttausch -
Kleine Anfrage des Herrn Abgeordneten Dr. Volker Külow, PDS-Fraktion
Drucksache 4/1727
Thema: Stationierung von NATO-Flugzeugen auf dem Flughafen Leipzig/Halle (V)
Sehr geehrter Herr Landtagspräsident,
namens und im Auftrag der Staatsregierung beantworte ich die Kleine Anfrage wie folgt:
(...)
4 .„Nach dem Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs gründete sich der Aufenthalt ausländischer Streitkräfte in Deutschland zunächst auf das Besatzungsrecht. Mit dem Inkrafttreten des sogenannten Deutschlandvertrags vom 26. Mai 1952 (Vertrag über die Beziehungen zwischen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und den Drei Mächten, BGBl. 1955 II S. 303) endete das Besatzungsregime am 5. Mai 1955. Am 23. Oktober 1954 wurde mit dem Vertrag über den Aufenthalt ausländischer Streitkräfte in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (BGBl. 1955 II S. 253) zwischen Deutschland und acht Vertragspartnern (Belgien, Dänemark, Frankreich, Kanada, Luxemburg, Niederlande, Vereinigtes Königreich, Vereinigte Staaten von Amerika) eine vertragliche Grundlage für den Aufenthalt der Stationierungsstreitkräfte in Deutschland geschaffen. Der Aufenthaltsvertrag gilt auch nach Abschluss des Zwei-plus-Vier-Vertrags (Vertrag über die abschließende Regelung in bezug auf Deutschland vom 12. September 1990, BGBl. 1990 II S. 1317) weiter, er kann nun aber mit einer zweijährigen Frist gekündigt werden (Notenwechsel vom 25. September 1990, BGBl. 1990 II S. 1390 und vom 16. November 1990, BGBl. 1990 II S. 1696). Er gilt auch weiterhin grundsätzlich nicht in den Bundesländern Berlin, Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt und Thüringen. Allerdings wurde durch Notenwechsel (vom 25. September 1990, BGBl. 1990 II S. 1251, BGBl. 1994 II S. 34 und vom 12. September 1994, BGBl. 1994 II S. 3716) den Streitkräften Frankreichs, des Vereinigten Königreichs Großbritannien und Nordirland, der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, Belgiens, Kanada und der Niederlande ein Aufenthaltsrecht für einen begrenzten Zeitraum in den Neuen Bundesländern einschließlich Berlin mit jeweiliger Zustimmung der deutschen Behörden eingeräumt.“ (vgl. Internetseite des Auswärtigen Amtes zum Thema: Truppenstationierungsrecht)
Inwieweit sieht die Staatsregierung angesichts dessen bei der beabsichtigten Stationierung von NATO-Flugzeugen und entsprechenden militärischen Personals Probleme oder Konfliktsituationen hinsichtlich diesbezüglicher völkerrechtlicher Festlegungen, insbesondere der des „Vertrages über die abschließende Regelung in bezug auf Deutschland“ vom 12.09.1990 (BGBL. II, S. 1317)?
Bei den „stationierten“ AN-124-100 handelt es sich um zivile Luftfahrtzeuge mit ziviler Besatzung. Ausländische Soldaten werden nicht verlegt und/oder stationiert. Insofern werden durch den „Stationierungsvorgang“, die AN-124-100 betreffend, die Bestimmungen des Zwei-plus-Vier-Vertrages nicht berührt. Gleiches gilt für den denkbaren Einzelfall, bei dem ausländisches militärisches Gerät durch ausländisches militärisches Personal auf dem Landweg nach Leipzig verbracht wird, um dort in die „stationierten“ AN-124-100 verladen und alsbald in ein Drittland abtransportiert werden. Eine Verlegung zum Zwecke der Stationierung oder eine Stationierung im Sinne von Artikel 5, Absatz 3 des Zwei-plus-Vier-Vertrages, die immer als eine auf eine gewisse Dauer angelegte Maßnahme zu verstehen ist, ist in einem solchen Vorgang nicht zu sehen.
Gleichwohl werden alle Fragen, die sich im Zusammenhang mit diesem vorübergehenden Aufenthalt von ausländischem militärischen Material und Personal ergeben, selbstverständlich gemäß der vereinbarten Protokollnotiz zum Zwei-plus-Vier-Vertrag „von der Regierung des vereinten Deutschland in einer vernüfntigen und verantwortungsbewussten Weise entschieden, wobei sie die Sicherheitsinteressen jeder Vertragspartei berücksichtigen wird“.
Beschluss der EU-Verteidigungsminister zu EU-Einsatzgruppen (Battle Groups)
22.11.2004
Brüssel
Declaration on European Military Capabilities
1. The European Union has entered a new stage in the process of strengthening military capabilities for crisis management, launching initiatives such as on the Headline Goal 2010, the EU Battlegroups, the civil-military cell and establishing the European Defence Agency (EDA). These initiatives contribute to the implementation of the European Security Strategy, enabling the European Union to deal better with threats and global challenges and realising the opportunities facing us. A more capable Europe will provide a significant contribution to the building of a more effective Common Foreign and Security Policy.
(...)
3. Member States are determined to implement the objectives of the Headline Goal 2010, including the creation of EU Battlegroups (as part of Rapid Response elements), providing the European Union with the Initial Operational Capability in 2005 and with commitments on the Full Operational Capability from 2007 onwards. The Member States are determined to develop further criteria and standards, building on the overarching standards and criteria for Battlegroups. The Ministers of Defence also agreed on the Global Approach on Deployability. This initiative will aim at more effective use of available assets, mechanisms and initiatives for strategic transport, a key enabler for Rapid Response.
(...)
Rapid Response - EU Battlegroups
9. The ability for the EU to deploy force packages at high readiness as a response to a crisis is a key element of the 2010 Headline Goal. The Battlegroup is a specific form of rapid response. It is the minimum military effective, credible, rapidly deployable, coherent force package capable of stand-alone operations, or for the initial phase of larger operations. The Battlegroup is based on a combined arms, battalion sized force and reinforced with Combat Support and Combat Service Support elements. A Battlegroup could be formed by a Framework Nation or by a multinational coalition of Member States. In all cases, interoperability and military effectiveness will be key criteria. A Battlegroup must be associated with a Force Headquarters and pre-identified operational and strategic enablers, such as strategic lift and logistics.
(...)
11. On decision making, the ambition of the EU is to be able to take the decision to launch an operation within 5 days of the approval of the Crisis Management Concept by the Council. On the deployment of forces, the ambition is that the forces start implementing their mission on the ground, no later than 10 days after the EU decision to launch the operation. This requires that Battlegroups will be built on assets and capabilities held at a readiness of 5-10 days. This readiness criterion applies as a benchmark to Member States as a whole. Battlegroups will be employable across the full range of tasks listed in the TEU Art.17.2 and those identified in the European Security Strategy, in particular in tasks of combat forces in crisis management, bearing in mind their size. Battlegroups need to be sustainable until mission termination or until relief by other forces. They should be sustainable for 30 days initial operations, extendable to 120 days, if re-supplied appropriately.
(...)
13. In May 2004 the GAERC concluded that commitments would be sought from Member States in order to achieve an initial Battlegroup capability in early 2005 and complete development in 2007. With a view to these commitments a definition and characteristics of the Initial Operational Capability (IOC) have been worked out. For the period 2005-2007 the EU will be able to undertake at least one Battlegroup-sized rapid response operation.
14. Full Operational Capability (FOC) will be reached in 2007. The Union should have the capacity to undertake two concurrent single Battlegroup-size rapid response operations, including the ability to launch both such operations nearly simultaneously.
(...)
16. The EU Battlegroups concept is complementary and mutually reinforcing with the NATO Response Force (NRF) documents while taking into account the characteristics of both organisations. Standards, practical methods and procedures will be compatible to those defined within NATO (NRF), wherever possible and applicable. The EU-NATO Capability Group, notably through ongoing exchange of information for addressing overall coherence and complementarity between EU Battlegroups and the NRF, will ensure coherent, transparent and mutually reinforcing development of the capability requirements common to both organisations.
(...)
Global Approach on Deployability
22. In May 2004, with a view to the EU's ambitions on rapid response, the Council recognised in particular the need to achieve further progress in improving capabilities for strategic mobility.
Strategic transport is one of the key enablers for the EU Battlegroups. In this context the Headline Goal 2010 mentions the following milestone: "the implementation by 2005 of EU Strategic joint lift coordination, with a view to achieving by 2010 necessary capacity and full efficiency in strategic lift (air, land and sea) in support of anticipated operations".
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Multinational
The European Airlift Centre (EAC) at Air Base Eindhoven has declared its services to the EU. Its primary function is to maximise the utilisation of airlift capability.
The Sealift Co-ordination Centre, co-located with EAC, has declared its services to the EU. Its primary function is to maximise the utilisation of sealift capability.
A Strategic Air Lift Co-ordination Cell (SALCC) is planned to operate by mid 2005. It will be co-located and embedded with the EAC. The SALCC will be the tasking authority for the use of the Strategic Airlift Interim Solution (SALIS) contract.
(...)
Global Approach on Deployability - Way Ahead
(...)
b. Analyse the existing co-ordination and deployability arrangements of Member States and identify existing gaps and shortfalls. In order to complete the picture of available strategic lift assets, capabilities that could be provided in the framework of an EU operation with recourse to NATO common assets and capabilities will have to be taken into account as well. Based on this analysis recommendations on the relationship between the EAC, SALCC, SCCs and national transportation and movement centres should be made. This will improve the co-ordination of all strategic lift assets, mechanisms and initiatives e.g. by developing effective links between the Co-ordination Cells/Centres. The study should take into account that the co-ordination during an EU-led crisis management operation will be conducted on the basis of a multinational detailed deployment plan. Work should be completed in the course of the first semester of 2005. (...)
Erklärung des Prager NATO-Gipfels zu NATO Response Forces
21.11.2002
PRAG
Prague Summit Declaration
Issued by the Heads of State and Government
participating in the meeting
of the North Atlantic Council in Prague
on 21 November 2002
1.We, the Heads of State and Government of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance, met today to enlarge our Alliance and further strengthen NATO to meet the grave new threats and profound security challenges of the 21st century.
(...)
4. We underscore that our efforts to transform and adapt NATO should not be perceived as a threat by any country or organisation, but rather as a demonstration of our determination to protect our populations, territory and forces from any armed attack, including terrorist attack, directed from abroad. We are determined to deter, disrupt, defend and protect against any attacks on us, in accordance with the Washington Treaty and the Charter of the United Nations. In order to carry out the full range of its missions, NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly to wherever they are needed, upon decision by the North Atlantic Council, to sustain operations over distance and time, including in an environment where they might be faced with nuclear, biological and chemical threats, and to achieve their objectives. Effective military forces, an essential part of our overall political strategy, are vital to safeguard the freedom and security of our populations and to contribute to peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic region. We have therefore decided to:
Create a NATO Response Force (NRF) consisting of a technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable force including land, sea, and air elements ready to move quickly to wherever needed, as decided by the Council. The NRF will also be a catalyst for focusing and promoting improvements in the Alliance’s military capabilities. We gave directions for the development of a comprehensive concept for such a force, which will have its initial operational capability as soon as possible, but not later than October 2004 and its full operational capability not later than October 2006, and for a report to Defence Ministers in Spring 2003. The NRF and the related work of the EU Headline Goal should be mutually reinforcing while respecting the autonomy of both organisations.
(...)
Das Original-Dokument finden Sie hier:
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-127e.htm
Beschluss des Europäischen Rats zur Schaffung eines Krisenreaktionskorps
11.12.1999
HELSINKI
Helsinki European Council
Annex IV of the Presidency Conclusions Helsinki European Council 10 and 11 December 1999
Presidency reports to the Helsinki European Council on "strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence" and on "non-military crisis management of the European Union"
(...)
To assume their responsibilities across the full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks defined in the EU Treaty, the Petersberg tasks, the Member States have decided to develop more effective military capabilities and establish new political and military structures for these tasks. In this connection, the objective is for the Union to have an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and then to conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises.
Also in order to assume these responsibilities, the Union will improve and make more effective use of resources in civilian crisis management in which the Union and the Members States already have considerable experience. Special attention will be given to a rapid reaction capability.
(...)
For this purpose, the following has been agreed:
A common European headline goal will be adopted for readily deployable military capabilities and collective capability goals in the fields of command and control, intelligence and strategic transport will be developed rapidly, to be achieved through voluntary co-ordinated national and multinational efforts, for carrying out the full range of Petersberg tasks.
(...)
To develop European capabilities, Member States have set themselves the headline goal: by the year 2003, cooperating together voluntarily, they will be able to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty, including the most demanding, in operations up to corps level (up to 15 brigades or 50,000-60,000 persons). These forces should be militarily self-sustaining with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, other combat support services and additionally, as appropriate, air and naval elements. Member States should be able to deploy in full at this level within 60 days, and within this to provide smaller rapid response elements available and deployable at very high readiness. They must be able to sustain such a deployment for at least one year. This will require an additional pool of deployable units (and supporting elements) at lower readiness to provide replacements for the initial forces.
Member States have also decided to develop rapidly collective capability goals in the fields of command and control, intelligence and strategic transport, areas also identified by the WEU audit. They welcome in this respect decisions already announced by certain Member States which go in that direction:
to develop and coordinate monitoring and early warning military means;
to open existing joint national headquarters to officers coming from other Member States;
to reinforce the rapid reaction capabilities of existing European multinational forces;
to prepare the establishment of a European air transport command;
to increase the number of readily deployable troops;
to enhance strategic sea lift capacity.
(...)
Das Original-Dokument finden Sie hier:
http://snipurl.com/mdft
Vertrag über die abschließende Regelung in bezug auf Deutschland
("Zwei-plus-Vier-Vertrag")
vom 12. September 1990
Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, die Deutsche Demokratische Republik, die Französische Republik, das Vereinigte Königreich Großbritannien und Nordirland, die Union der Sozialistischen Sowjetrepubliken und die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika -
(...)
SIND wie folgt ÜBEREINGEKOMMEN:
(...)
Artikel 5
(...)
(3) Nach dem Abschluß des Abzugs der sowjetischen Streitkräfte vom Gebiet der heutigen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik und Berlins können in diesem Teil Deutschlands auch deutsche Streitkräfteverbände stationiert werden, die in gleicher Weise militärischen Bündnisstrukturen zugeordnet sind wie diejenigen auf dem übrigen deutschen Hoheitsgebiet, allerdings ohne Kernwaffenträger. Darunter fallen nicht konventionelle Waffensysteme, die neben konventioneller andere Einsatzfähigkeiten haben können, die jedoch in diesem Teil Deutschlands für eine konventionelle Rolle ausgerüstet und nur dafür vorgesehen sind. Ausländische Streitkräfte und Atomwaffen oder deren Träger werden in diesem Teil Deutschlands weder stationiert noch dorthin verlegt.
